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ABSTRACT
Puerto Rico has been a United States territory since 1898. Since then, the
island has remained in an ill-defined relationship with the United States,
lacking autonomy and sovereignty. The Supreme Court and Congress have
been the primary agents dealing with Puerto Rico’s territorial trajectory.
While the island has faced many setbacks throughout the years, this thesis
asserts that the zenith in autonomy and sovereignty was reached in the
1950s, after two key legislative developments. This set forth an experiment
in territorial administration. But the experiment was abandoned and closed
in 2016, after two Supreme Court decisions and an Act of Congress sent
Puerto Rico—the experiment—in retrograde motion. This thesis explores
Puerto Rico’s politico-legal developments, with a focus on the 1950s and 2016.
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I.

Introduction

I love America more than any other country in the world, and, exactly for this
reason, I insist on the right to criticize her perpetually.
-James Baldwin, Notes of a Native Son.
In 1950, the United States began its foray into an experimental
territorial administration it had never utilized. Puerto Rico was that
experiment. That year marked the beginning of the constitution-making
process that no other territory had experienced. In essence, this degree of
autonomy provided the island a glimpse into what could come with greater
autonomy and self-government, akin to those of a State. But the project was
left incomplete. Instead of expanding on those new self-governing measures,
the United States precluded Puerto Rico from advancing. These restrictions
on self-government were evident and most powerful in 2016 when a
combination of judicial and legislative decisions sent Puerto Rico back to a
time where the 1950s self-government victories did not exist.
This thesis will explore Puerto Rico’s significant politic-legal events that
either contributed or derailed the aims of the experiment in autonomy. First,
a glimpse into Puerto Rico’s early days in the polity, with a focus on Congress’
and the Supreme Court’s actions. These first administrative actions dealt
with Puerto Rico differently, and rather than placing the island on the
traditional territorial path—statehood—Congress left it in an amorphous

1

condition sanctioned by the Court. Additionally, the island was bereft of full
constitutional protections, because of the Court’s interpretation of Congress's
powers over the territory.
Next, the events that precipitated the 1950s constitution-making
process. These include the granting of United States citizenship to Puerto
Ricans as well as other court decisions shaping the relations between
Washington, D.C., and the island. While significant, these developments did
not amount to a substantial change in the power dynamic between the
mainland and Puerto Rico.
Then come the 1950s and Puerto Rico’s sudden rise in autonomy.
While the constitution-making process was not a perfect experiment, it was
meant to be the beginning of something novel, grand, and a giant leap for
Puerto Rico’s advancement within the polity. This thesis will show that this
point was the zenith in Puerto Rico’s autonomy, but it was not the end.
However, Congress seemed to have turned away from that experiment and
eventually shut down the benevolent creation, leaving it without further
sustenance. The lack of punctiliousness and sustenance turned into
autonomous starvation in 2016. While the island was in a condition of
financial tumult, Congress and the Court took steps that severed Puerto
Rico’s self-governing peduncle. This set the island in a celeritous retrograde

2

motion, almost equaling the measures under Spanish rule. Puerto Rico has
been left in this position since 2016.
The last chapters are concerned with both the occurrences of 2016 and
the specific effects inflicted on Puerto Rico’s autonomy and sovereignty.
Lastly, this thesis embodies the philosophical adage of finding a solution
embedded in the problem, as the only authority that can do anything
concerning Puerto Rico’s fate is the body that began the different treatment:
Congress.

3

II.

Pre-Spanish-American War Puerto Rico

Before the Spanish-American War, Puerto Rico had chiefly been a
Spanish colony since the island’s discovery in 1493.1 Puerto Rico was
governed by a distant sovereign with no control over its local affairs—its
citizenry enjoyed no representation at Las Cortes de Cádiz (Las Cortes),
Spain’s parliament.2 Granted, Puerto Rico experienced some mild
improvements in sovereignty, underscored by the 1812 Cádiz Constitution.3
This Constitution granted Puerto Rico and the other Spanish colonies
unparalleled freedoms, including representation in the central government.4
In any event, this constitutional anomaly was quickly eradicated after the
Spanish conservatives “overthrew [the government] by force and restored
absolute power to the king” in 1814.5 Puerto Rico’s body politic has never
enjoyed representation comparable to that set in the Cádiz Constitution, even
when under the authority of the world’s chief democracy.
Post-1814, Puerto Rico continued its struggles over local self-rule. For
the most part, the Spanish dismissed their pleas. For instance, in 1869, the

JOSÉ TRÍAS MONGE, PUERTO RICO: THE TRIALS OF THE OLDEST COLONY IN THE WORLD 7
(1997).
2 Id. at 9.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
1

4

“most liberal” Spanish Constitution was adopted by Las Cortes.6 In this
iteration, Puerto Rico gained some key rights, specifically the right to elect
representatives to Las Cortes.7 Also, the 1869 Constitution enabled Puerto
Ricans to organize themselves into political parties.8 This development
would ultimately allow Puerto Rico to abolish slavery in 1873:9 another key
victory for Puerto Rico’s self-rule. A year later, after the monarchy struck
back and replaced the Spanish Republic, those concessions were quickly
eradicated.10 Puerto Rico attempted many bargains with Spain regarding the
island’s political status in the interim period before the onset of the SpanishAmerican War; this would also be a recurring theme in Puerto Rico’s politicolegal relations with the United States. These negotiations, or pleas, led to
Spain granting “charters of autonomy and greater constitutional and
electoral rights” to Puerto Rico (as well as Cuba) in 1897.11 Puerto Rico was
not to enjoy these newfound freedoms, as the United States and Spain were
on an irreversible collision course over Cuba.

Id. at 10. Deemed the most liberal of constitution due to Puerto Rico’s civil rights gains
from it.
7 SAM ERMAN, ALMOST CITIZENS: PUERTO RICO, THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, AND EMPIRE 17
(2019).
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 18. The abolition of slavery on the island survived the toppling of the Spanish
Republic.
11 Id.
6
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Puerto Rico had enjoyed little to no involvement in the decisions
controlling it since the island’s early days. When the Spanish-American War
erupted, Puerto Ricans thought that once under the United States’ control,
the lack of self-government would be rebuffed by the world’s leading
democracy.12 However, to the island’s dismay, the United States would not
be the emissary of those pure freedoms. Puerto Rico would have to wait until
after the United States’ arrival on the island to face this reality.

A. The United States and Puerto Rico Before 1898
While Cuba fueled the hostilities between the United States and Spain, it
must be said that Puerto Rico and the United States were aware of each
other before the conflict’s onset. As Efrén Rivera Ramos informs, there was a
“commercial agent” from the United States in Puerto Rico since 1815.13 This
agent became the United States Consul fourteen years later.14 This officer
was tasked with “promoti[ng] [the] American economic relations with Puerto
Rico.”15 Further, Puerto Rico and the United States had developed a
relationship based on commerce, with Puerto Rico consuming a “considerable

Id. at 27 (“As U.S. troops overran Puerto Rico, islanders and conquerors alike hailed what
they saw as a benevolent constitutional revolution. It was easy to imagine that annexation
would bring Puerto Ricans U.S. citizenship, rights, and eventual statehood”).
13 EFRÉN RIVERA RAMOS, THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY: THE JUDICIAL AND SOCIAL
LEGACY OF AMERICAN COLONIALISM IN PUERTO RICO 53 (2001) (inner citation omitted).
14 Id.
15 Id.
12
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number of American goods” and the United States importing a “substantial
amount” of Puerto Rican sugar.16
United States officials had expressed a desire to occupy the island
before 1898. For example, in 1891 Secretary of State James G. Blaine
responded to President Benjamin Harrison’s need for more overseas military
bases by recommending the invaluable acquisition of Puerto Rico, along with
that of Hawaii and Cuba.17 Similarly, in 1894 the Naval War College
prepared a contingency plan in case of a war with Spain that involved
“blocking and occupying Puerto Rico.”18 Moreover, when the shadow of war
seemed to consume the island, the United States military command
suggested that Puerto Rico should be the focus of the conquest, instead of
Cuba, and the United States Consul in Puerto Rico had urged the acquisition
of Puerto Rico.19
Amid the conflict, Theodore Roosevelt, then the Lieutenant Colonel of the
Rough Riders stationed in Cuba,20 wrote to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge: “Do
not make peace until we get Porto Rico [sic] ( … ).”21

Id.
Id. (inner citation omitted).
18 Id. (inner citation omitted).
19 Id. (inner citations omitted).
20 THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THE ROUGH RIDERS, 7 (1899). The Rough Riders were the
volunteer cavalry regiment in Cuba during the Spanish-American War.
21 Rivera Ramos, supra note 11, at 53-54.
16
17
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III.

The Origins and End of the Splendid Little War: How
Puerto Rico Became a United States Territory

In one shape or another, the United States had been pursuing the
annexation of Cuba since 1822.22 These efforts came to naught, as the Cuban
independence movement kept the United States’ annexation interests at
bay.23 But the United States and Cuba were irrevocably tangled as their
commercial relationship—based on sugar—evolved.24 The United States
consumed “87% of Cuba’s exports.”25 Before 1898, economic interests alone
were insufficient to justify the United States’ intervention in Cuba, but the
Cuban insurrection, along with the press coverage and the election of William
McKinley in 1896, started planting the permanent and propagative seeds of
intervention.26 The casus belli was soon to come.
Tensions among the United States and Spain over Cuba were
determined to boil over, but Congress’s ultimate impetus had not yet arrived.
Then came the incident with the Maine. The U.S.S. Maine had been deployed
to Cuba to protect American commerce as the Cuban rebellion intensified.27
This seemingly ordinary procedure would help persuade the United States to

JUAN R. TORRUELLA, GLOBAL INTRIGUES: THE ERA OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR AND THE
RISE OF THE UNITED STATES TO WORLD POWER 53 (2007).
23 Id.
24 Id. at 54.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 56.
27The USS Maine explodes in Cuba’s Havana Harbor, HISTORY.COM
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/the-maine-explodes (last visited Aug. 29, 2021).
22
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declare war on Spain when the Maine exploded off the coast of Cuba on
February 15, 1898.28 The expansionists and press embodied carpe diem and
accused Spain of being the belligerents. For instance, Theodore Roosevelt,
then the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, wrote: “The Maine was sunk by an
act of dirty treachery on the part of the Spaniards.”29 Similarly, media giants
like Joseph Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst, from the New York World
and New York Journal accordingly, circulated stories fueling the calls for a
declaration of war.30 For example, when corresponding with artist Frederic
Remington, who was in Cuba, William Randolph Hearst cabled the following:
“You furnish the pictures and I’ll furnish the war.”31 These compelling
agents eagerly exercised their influences on the Government, ultimately
paving the way for the declaration of war.

A. The Influence of Sea Power and the Rough Riders Upon the
Spanish-American War: A Quick End to the War
In April 1898, President William McKinley requested Congress send a
final notice to Spain over the Cuban situation which specified the following:
(1) Spain needed to recognize Cuba’s independence and; (2) Spain’s forces

Id.
Louis A. Pérez, Jr., The Meaning of the Maine: Causation and the Historiography of the
Spanish-American War, 58 PAC. HIST. REV. 293, 294 (1989).
30 Id.
31 The Press: I’ll Furnish the War, TIME MAG. (Oct. 27, 1947),
http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,854840,00.html.
28
29

9

were to evacuate the island with great celerity.32 President McKinley’s
message argued that intervention was justified for “the cause of humanity
and to put an end to the barbarities, bloodshed, starvation, and horrible
miseries,”33 an argument that would become ironic once the United States
acquired Puerto Rico and the other former Spanish colonies post-war.
President McKinley also rested on the report filed by the “naval court of
inquiry,” which concluded that the Maine had exploded because of a mine.34
While the inquiry did not determine an aggressor, the President urged
Congress that the Maine’s demise was a prime example of the state of affairs,
making an intervention on behalf of the Cuban people necessary.35 Congress
was sympathetic to the President’s arguments, relaying the ultimatum to
Spain on April 21, 1898.36 In response, Spain jilted the proposal and opted to
terminate all relations with the United States instead.37 Four days later, the
United States declared war on Spain.38 And with this declaration, the United
States launched its foray into vast empire-building.

Torruella, supra note 22, at 103.
William McKinley, Message to Congress Requesting a Declaration of War with Spain (Apr.
11, 1898), available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/304972.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Torruella, supra note 22, at 103.
37 Id.
38 Id.
32
33
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The war lasted around 120 days.39 The conflict’s brevity was because
of the United States’ herculean Navy.40 Moreover, the United States
conducted a bifurcated war, with a special focus being devoted to Cuba and
the Philippines.41 The naval forces around Cuba and the Philippines swiftly
defeated the Spanish forces, while Theodore Roosevelt and his Rough Riders
easily disposed of the defenses in Cuba.42 The coup de grâce was delivered to
Spain at Santiago Harbor in Cuba.43 There, the United States Navy
prevailed on the eve of the Fourth of July.44 Twenty-one days later, the
United States landed in Puerto Rico. The United States forces rapidly
defeated the light resistance they encountered. Puerto Rico received these
troops with pomp and circumstance. And with that, Puerto Rico began its
history as a United States territory.

B. The Emergence of the American Empire: An Overview of the
Exclusive Treaty of Paris
Negotiations ensued between the United States and Spain after
hostilities ceased on August 14.45 The United States delegation was
representative of the McKinley Administration, with its majority composed of

Id.
Torruella, supra note 22, at 104.
41 Id. at 104.
42 Id. at 106.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 107.
45 Id. at 108.
39
40
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expansionists.46 The negotiations were prolonged, in part, because of Spain’s
hesitation in relinquishing the Philippines to the United States.47 Ironically,
Puerto Rico, as well as the other former Spanish possessions, was not privy to
the events occurring behind closed doors in Paris.48 In a tone echoed through
the annals of Puerto Rican history, the negotiations were considered
impertinent to the island.
In a more granular analysis, the treaty was not unique. It contained
seventeen articles. These articles detailed several aspects of the agreement,
including lands to be ceded to the United States (Arts. II, III, VIII), religious
liberty (Art. X), as well as other miscellaneous matters.49 Article II ceded
Puerto Rico to the United States but said nothing else of import.50 Article IX
unlocked pandora’s box of Congress’s power over territorial administration:
“The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the
territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the
Congress.”51 As Puerto Rico would come to realize, it was this article that
would be used to justify its subservient place in the American polity.

Id. at 157.
Id. at 158-59.
48 Id.
49 Treaty of Peace Between the United States and Spain, Dec. 10, 1898, available at
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/sp1898.asp#art2 (hereinafter Treaty of Paris of
1898).
50 Id.
51 Id. art. IX.
46
47
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After nearly a year since the declaration of war, and after much
debate among politicians in the United States, the Treaty of Paris of 1898
became law on April 11, 1899.52 With the ratification, the United States
acquired Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines.53 Manifest Destiny was on
full display, but the Government had no idea how to administer the new
territories.

52
53

Trías Monge, supra note 1, at 161.
Id.
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IV.

A “New” American Territory: Of Different Rules and
Regulations

When United States forces landed, many in Puerto Rico believed a
“constitutional revolution” was afoot.54 The island’s political leaders
thought that “citizenship, rights, and statehood” were on the horizon.55
Almost every move taken by the United States or its agents about Puerto
Rico seemed to confirm those hopes. For instance, the Department of
State had assessed that naturalization for Puerto Rico was near, which in
turn led to the United States military officials requiring that some
officeholders in the island take the naturalization oath.56 This involved
devoting all allegiance to the United States, promising to defend the
Constitution, and renouncing the Spanish Crown and government.57
Similarly, United States officials began treating Puerto Rico as part of the
United States, given the application of several United States statutes on
the island.58 On top of this, some of the island’s influential political
leaders, like Federico Degetau, promoted the idea that Puerto Ricans and
the People of the United States were connected because “‘Latins and
Anglo-Saxons were coauthors of democracy.”59 Even Degetau’s worst-case

Erman, supra note 7, at 27.
Id.
56 Id. at 28.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 37.
54
55
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scenario, that of Puerto Ricans and “mainlanders” being considered
unequal, would not be worrisome, since the United States forces had
promised those liberties compatible with the United States’ ideals.60 If
the United States defaulted on those promises, Degetau thought, it would
paint the Nation in the most unkind manner.61 While there was much
debate between the island’s political parties over status, one thing united
them during this period: whether granted autonomy over its internal
affairs comparable to that of States or some other egalitarian relationship,
the relationship had to be one under the United States’ principles of
liberty.62
Political leaders within the United States, such as military governorgeneral George Davis, did not think Puerto Ricans deserved said equal
status or the full application of self-governing principles. As he assessed,
“[Puerto Ricans were] no more fit to take part in self-government than are
our reservation Indians, from whom the suffrage is withheld ….”63
Davis’s rhetoric on Puerto Rico, combined with his influence in
Washington, D.C., played a key role in the island’s subsequent
subjugation.

Id.
Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
60
61
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Stateside, there was much palavering on Capitol Hill and at 1600
Pennsylvania Avenue over the new acquisitions’ destinies. President
McKinley wanted to establish a firm holding over Puerto Rico and the
Philippines, and consequently urged his Secretary of War, Elihu Root, to
set the framework for the new territories’ administration.64 In his
writings, Root framed three queries which were to guide his
recommendations for Puerto Rico:
(1) What form of government shall be established, and what
participation in that government shall the people of the island
have? (2) What shall be the treatment of the municipal law of the
island, and how far shall the laws which now regulate the rights
and conduct of the people be changed to conform to the ideas
prevalent among the people of the United States? (3) What
economic relations shall be established between the island and
the United States?65
In response to the first question, Root asserted that Puerto Ricans
were not “educated in the art of self-government, or any really honest
government.”66 Based on this flawed assessment, since the United States did
not allow for Puerto Rico to bask in the practice of self-government,67 Root
determined the island should have a governor appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate, and that other government officials be appointed in

Id.
ELIHU ROOT, The Principles of Colonial Policy: Porto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines, in
THE MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES: ADDRESSES AND REPORTS BY
ELIHU ROOT 163, 163 (Robert Bacon & James Brown Scott eds., 1916).
66 Id.
67 Truman R. Clark, “Educating the Natives in Self-Government”: Puerto Rico and the
United States, 1900-1933, 42 PAC. HIST. REV. 220, 223 (1973).
64
65
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the same fashion.68 He also proposed a “legislative council” to be made from
the appointed government officials and a “minority” from “the people of the
island,” but these were also subject to the President’s appointment powers.69
Worse yet, Root recommended that legislation passed by the council be
subject to vetoes by Congress and the President.70 The Puerto Rican people
were only to exercise their civic duty in municipal elections, and those were to
be restricted to men who could “read and write, or who hold property ….”71
Root, a Reconstruction Republican, was now in favor of truncating
enfranchisement in the same fashion as Southern officials before the
Reconstruction Amendments.72
In terms of the second question, Root contended that the civil law of
Puerto Rico, instituted by Spain, should not be replaced, or altered, since “a
system of laws based on the experience and characteristics of a New England
community would be both oppressive and futile” to Puerto Rico.73 The basis
for this was Louisiana, a former Spanish territory that also had a civil code
and it remained untouched after the former territory’s invitation into the

Root, supra note 65, at 166.
Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 167.
72 The Reconstruction Amendments are the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments. These granted freedom from involuntary servitude, the equal protection of the
laws, and the right to vote regardless of race, accordingly.
73 Id. at 169.
68
69
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Union.74 However, unlike Louisiana, the Supreme Court would rely on this
different system of government to justify the inapplicability of the United
States Constitution.
As for the third prong, Root maintained that free trade was crucial for
Puerto Rico’s advancement.75 He discouraged economic isolation and thus
requested the repeal of tariffs that had erected an economic wall around
Puerto Rico.76
Root’s analysis did not stop here: He further thought that Puerto Rico
should be made a different type of territory and that it never be made a
state.77 He later partnered with Charles Magoon, an officer for the Division
of Customs and Insular Affairs, to offer more options for the unequal
treatment of Puerto Rico.78 The duo declared the Dred Scott precedent that
“the Constitution extended broad rights to the territories and demanded that
they one day become [S]tates” to have been of a pre-Civil War era, thus
having been eradicated by the War.79 Then, the duo proposed that

Id.
Id. at 170.
76 Id.
77 Erman, supra note 7, at 39.
78 Id. at 40.
79 Id. at 40-41. In Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 446 (1857), the Supreme Court
postulated the following regarding the application of the Constitution to the territories:
“There is certainly no power given by the Constitution to the Federal Government to
establish or maintain colonies bordering on the United States or at a distance, to be ruled
and governed at its own pleasure ….” This decision, while obtuse for other reasons, properly
assessed the power of the Federal Government under the Constitution regarding the
administration of territories.
74
75

18

traditional Fourteenth Amendment citizenship be sidestepped on the island,
replacing the doctrine of jus soli—that "birth within the lands over which
U.S. sovereignty extended automatically conferred citizenship.”80 This
eroded years of custom and tradition.81 Senator Joseph Foraker went into
action with this ammunition at his disposal. Puerto Rico was bound to move
in a retrograde motion.

80
81

Id.
Id.
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V.

All Needful Rules and Regulations: Congress’s
Organization of Puerto Rico

With Root’s recommendations in mind, Senator Joseph Foraker of Ohio
and Congressman Sereno Payne of New York drafted a law that would
incorporate most of Root’s theories—the Organic Act for Puerto Rico. The
goal of the Act was to test the waters for the administration of the larger,
more unfurled acquisition: the Philippines.82 Both the White House and
the Act’s architects anticipated the emanation of sundry constitutional
issues from the legislation, as it would be the first of its kind.83
The Foraker Act was enacted on April 12, 1900, when President
McKinley officially approved the colonial experiment.84 The Act moved to
address the questions of tariffs, citizenship, and the system of civil
government.85 Puerto Rico would face losses in all three policy domains.
For purposes of tariffs, the Foraker Act imposed a fifteen percent tariff
on goods imported from Puerto Rico.86 This quickly erected the economic

José A. Cabranes, Citizenship and the American Empire, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 391, 415 (1978)
(“[The] legislation for Puerto Rico would be a precedent for the larger and more menacing
problem of the Philippines”).
83 Id. (“It was also feared that the Puerto Rico legislation would be the subject of portentous
constitutional litigation challenging congressional power to regulate trade with and
migration from the insular territories, as well as the capacity of the legislative branch to
determine whether Puerto Ricans ( … ) would become United States citizens”). This
constitutional litigation would become the infamous Insular Cases.
84 See Cabranes, Citizenship and the American Empire, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 391, 435.
85 Root, supra note 65.
86 An Act Temporarily to provide revenues and a civil government for Porto Rico, and for
other purposes, Pub. L. No. 56-191, § 3, 31 Stat. 77 (1900) (hereinafter Foraker Act).
82

20

wall around Puerto Rico Root had cautioned against.87 This step had no
precedent and significantly differed from other contemporary Organic
Acts, such as Hawaii’s.88 The distinction stemmed from lobbies from the
tobacco, sugar, and whisky trusts in a move to protect the stateside
markets.89 In effect, the Act treated Puerto Rico as a foreign country,
imposing tariffs on goods, rather than allowing the free trade customary
to the United States and lands appurtenant to it. With that began the
period of economic isolation for the island that has plagued it to this day.
Puerto Ricans and their posterity, contrary to the principles of jus soli,
were not named American citizens. They were instead labeled “citizens of
Porto Rico [sic]” who were to enjoy “the protection of the United States”
consistent with the civil rights provision set in the Treaty of Paris—that
they be determined by Congress.90 In effect, the Foraker Act created
second-class citizenship within the American polity,91 one that did not rise
to the level of actual U.S. citizenship. The Foraker Act removed the
“blessings of liberty”92 from the Constitution and placed them in
Congress’s hands. This would become the subject of the Supreme Court’s
debate over Puerto Rico in 1901.
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On the question of civil government, the Foraker Act provided for a
Governor, his Executive Council, and a House of Delegates.93 The
Governor was to be appointed by the President of the United States if he
had the Senate’s approval.94 The Governor was also granted veto power
over legislation passed by the House of Delegates.95 Lastly, the Governor
was to be supported by an Executive Council comprised of “a secretary,
attorney-general, a treasurer, auditor, a commissioner of the interior, and
a commissioner of education,” along with “five other persons” all subject to
the President’s appointment powers.96 Out of the eleven-member
Executive Council, only five had to be Puerto Ricans.97 Out of the five,
none were to be chosen by the populace. After the Act went into effect, all
the members leading the departments were from the mainland, and the
required minimum number of Puerto Ricans occupied the other five
seats.98 The Foraker Act was an enfeebled version of representative
government.
After the institution of an unelected Governor and his Executive
Council, the Foraker Act set up a bicameral legislature composed of the
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Executive Council and the House of Delegates.99 The House of Delegates
was to be made of thirty-five members elected by the people.100 But the
people referred to here were those who met the “qualifications of voters
under the laws and military orders in force.”101 The stringent voting
provision meant that not even universal male suffrage would be in effect
on the island without the legislature’s permission.102 This meant that
such provision would be at the mercy of the Governor and his veto
powers.103 And even if the bill (or any bill for that matter) survived the
Governor’s veto, it would be subject to Congress’s, with the branch
reserving the power to “annul the [laws]” of the island.104
To keep diluting the power of the Puerto Rican populace, and to
appease the charges of colonialism, the Act provided for an amorphous
representative in Congress—the Resident Commissioner.105 The Resident
Commissioner was and is powerless, since the delegate enjoys no voting
power in Congress, and for the first few years, the delegate could not
access the halls of Congress.106 The idea of government by consent
celeritously evaporated with a single Act of Congress.
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The Foraker Act was followed in 1917 by Puerto Rico’s second organic
law—the Jones-Shafroth Act.107 This Act addressed the issue of
citizenship for Puerto Ricans. One of the Act’s architects, Congressman
William A. Jones (Democratic Party)—Chairman of the House Committee
on Insular Affairs—was preoccupied with the notion that if Puerto Rico
were to become a State in the Union, the balance of power in Congress
would be in Puerto Ricans’ hands.108 Yet the former Confederate
steadfastly believed that Puerto Rico needed to be under the
Constitution’s full protection and that its populace was to be American
citizens.109 Further, Congressman Jones and his party argued that the
United States should not perpetually hold the people of Puerto Rico in the
ranks of “‘subjects and not citizens.’”110 Additionally, granting citizenship
to Puerto Rico would commit the United States to a more everlasting
relationship with Puerto Rico, allaying the calls for independence from
some on the island.111 The then legal officer for the Bureau of Insular
Affairs, Felix Frankfurter, proposed a solution.112 Future Justice
Frankfurter’s proposition relied on the Supreme Court’s ambiguous
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territorial doctrines and the fact that “constitutional rights, citizenship,
[United States] sovereignty, and self-government in dependent locales
were entirely within congressional control.”113 In other words, Puerto
Rico’s fate was subject to Congress’s plenary powers.
The Jones-Shafroth Act provided for the collective naturalization of
Puerto Ricans, making them United States citizens.114 As Congressman
Towner stated: “[w]e are conferring on [Puerto Ricans] what they ought to
have had years ago and what they earnestly desire—the privilege of being
American citizens and being placed under the protection of our flag.”115
The Act also made several alterations to the existing organic act (the
Foraker Act), but most importantly, the Jones-Shafroth Act provided a bill
of rights for the island.116 The only thing the Act imparted was that “no
law shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, or deny to any person the equal protection of the laws.”117
There was also a provision against double jeopardy,118 but at the same
time, there was the significant omission of the sacred right to a jury trial.
In a way, the Jones-Shafroth Act propelled Puerto Rico forward even if
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antidemocratic restraints, like voting restrictions, were present.119 But
the Act failed to bring about the full protection of the Constitution to
Puerto Rico in continuance of the Treaty of Paris and the Foraker Act. As
summarized by Circuit Judge Cabranes, the Jones-Shafroth Act
“liberalized the structure of colonial government in Puerto Rico and
granted substantially more governmental autonomy to the island” when
compared to the shoddy Foraker Act.120 But even with these quasiautonomous victories present, the Jones-Shafroth Act “reaffirmed the
indefinite status of the island by conferring a type of citizenship on its
inhabitants that strengthened Puerto Rico’s ties to the United States but
gave its people few of the civil and political rights normally associated
with American citizenship.”121 In all, the American citizenship bestowed
upon Puerto Ricans was effectively a diluted version of that inherent in
traditional citizenship.
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VI. Justice Thou Shalt Not Have: The Insular Cases
& Puerto Rico
To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that
limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be
passed by those intended to be restrained? The distinction, between
a government with limited and unlimited powers, is abolished, if
those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed,
and if acts prohibited and acts allowed are of equal obligation.
-Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803)
The Supreme Court and Puerto Rico have been inextricably connected
since the implementation of the Foraker Act. Moreover, the Court has played
a crucial role in eradicating or undermining Puerto Rico’s claims to
sovereignty, or at least sovereignty compatible with Puerto Rico’s status as a
territory. Leading scholars’ and lawyers’ prevalent opinions at the time of
Puerto Rico’s acquisition, such as that enounced by Michigan Supreme Court
Justice Thomas Cooley, described the Constitution as one “made for the
States, not for Territories.”122 The Court would adopt these assertions in a
series of decisions known as the Insular Cases, ranging from 1900 to 1922.
The decisions covered in this section will be paramount to the Court’s role in
severing the tenets of constitutional protections for Puerto Rico.
Downes v. Bidwell, the first prominent case of the Insular Cases occurred
in response to the Foraker Act’s imposition of tariffs on Puerto Rico. Samuel

THOMAS COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 36 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1981) (1880).
122

27

Downes, a merchant who worked for S.B. Downes & Co., and imported
oranges from Puerto Rico to New York, disputed the constitutionality of over
$600 in tariffs being levied on the oranges.123 Downes claimed that these
tariffs violated the United States Constitution’s Taxing and Spending Clause:
“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts
and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises
shall be uniform throughout the United States.”124 In sum, Downes argued
that since Puerto Rico was part of the United States, Congress acted in an
extra-constitutional manner when it implemented tariffs on Puerto Rico.
In Downes v. Bidwell, the Court had to decide whether the tariffs were
constitutional.125 The Court elaborated that in a broader sense, the question
presented required the Justices to investigate whether “the revenue clauses
of the Constitution extend [ex propio vigore] to our newly acquired
territories.”126 Justice Brown, writing for the Court, held that a historical
inquiry into territorial administration yielded that territories, in general,
were never considered part of the United States.127 Instead, the territories
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were subject to Congress’s plenary powers under the Territory Clause,128 thus
making Congress the principal actor tasked with determining whether
provisions of the Constitution applied. The Court observed that “[i]n all these
( … ) Territories subsequently organized west of the Mississippi, Congress
thought it necessary either to extend the Constitution and laws of the United
States over them, or to declare that the inhabitants should be entitled to
enjoy [constitutional provisions].”129 Further, the majority wrote that
Congress’s power to administer territories and determine exactly what
applied to them was deducible from Congress’s power to acquire said
territories.130 The Court elaborated that while there are aspects of the
Constitution about the admittance of new States into the Union, “nothing is
said regarding the acquisition of new territories or the extension of the
Constitution over them.”131 The Court concluded by saying that “those
possessions inhabited by alien races”132 were in “a territory appurtenant and
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belonging to the United States, but not a part of the United States within the
revenue clauses of the Constitution,”133 making the Foraker Act’s tariffs
constitutional.
While the majority opinion was dispositive of the tariffs question,
Justice Edward Douglass White’s concurrence planted the seeds for Puerto
Rico’s continued unequal treatment. Justice White’s concurrence would be
adopted by the Government and Court for decades to come.
At the heart of Justice White’s concurrence was the doctrine of
incorporated and unincorporated territories: “[I]t seems to me impossible to
conceive that the treaty-making power by a mere cession can incorporate an
alien people into the United State without the express or implied approval of
Congress.”134 Justice White employed an alarmist tone asserting that if those
residing in Puerto Rico were “immediately and irrevocably incorporated into
the United States,” the underpinnings of the Republic would be
“overthrown.”135 According to Justice White, the unprecedented theory of
incorporated and unincorporated territory was evinced by some sort of
incorporating language in prior acquisitions, and that the treaty power was
not determinative of a territory’s incorporation status.136
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Justice White fortified his theory with phraseological arguments
regarding the meaning of the United States at the time of the Constitution’s
adoption.137 Still, what is problematic in Justice White’s concurrence is the
incongruity of just how dispositive a treaty is of a territory’s status. As
stated above, the Justice did not subscribe to a treaty’s power of
incorporation, but later claims Article IX of the Treaty of Paris left Puerto
Rico’s destiny in Congress’s hands: “The civil rights and political status of
the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States
shall be determined by the Congress.”138 Furthermore, Justice White
believed that said provision in the treaty confirmed the absence of (illdefined) incorporative language:
I cannot doubt that the express purpose of the [Treaty of Paris]
was not only to leave the status of the territory to be determined
by Congress but to prevent the treaty from operating to the
contrary …. And, in addition, the provisions of the act by which
the duty here ( … ) was imposed, taken as a whole, seem to me
plainly at least Porto Rico [sic] is not to be incorporated into the
United States.139
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To appreciate this it is essential to bear in mind what the words ‘United States'
signified at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. When by the treaty of peace
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Justice White’s tower of incongruities was capped by declaring Puerto Rico to
be “foreign to the United States in a domestic sense.”140 The meaning of this
perplexes scholars and jurists to this day,141 and the Court has failed to issue
a clarification in 120 years, though that may soon change.142
The opinions also “quietly” overruled Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion
in Loughborough v. Blake, which deemed that the term the United States
applied to States and territories.143 Moreover, in Loughborough, Chief
Justice Marshall explicated that “it is not less necessary, on the principles of
our Constitution, that uniformity in the imposition of imposts, duties, and
excises, should be observed in [States, and not in territories].”144 Clearly,
under Loughborough, the Foraker imposts would not have survived
constitutional muster given the Uniformity Clause. By upholding the tariffs
in Downes, the Court overruled those early Marshall Court pronouncements.
Justices Peckham, Brewer, Harlan, and Chief Justice Fuller dissented.
Yet the most enlightening dissent in Downes belonged to the Justice deemed
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“The Great Dissenter”: Justice John Marshall Harlan. In his dissent, Justice
Harlan admonished the Court’s opinion and concurrences and pointed out
their contradictions and flaws, as explained more fully below.
Justice Harlan noted that the concurrences’ assertions of a
Constitution for and by States only were flagrantly flawed and incorrect:
“The Constitution speaks not simply to the States in their organized
capacities, but to all peoples, whether of States or territories, who are subject
to the authority of the United States.”145 What is more, Justice Harlan
argued that if the views expressed by some of the concurrences—the ideas
that Congress could plenarily administer the territories—were espoused by a
majority of the Court in the future, “[w]e will, in that event, pass from the era
of constitutional liberty guarded and protected by a written constitution into
an era of legislative absolutism.”146 In other words, Justice Harlan
condemned the view that Congress could administer new territories with
authority derived from other sources, with a special focus on the way the
British Empire administered its holdings.147 If Congress were to employ that
approach and if the Court were to bless it, “[the conduct would] engraft upon
our republican institutions a colonial system such as exists under
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monarchical governments … such a result was never contemplated by the
fathers of the Constitution.”148 Justice Harlan continued by stating that if
the Court adopted those views of an absolutist Congress, the Court would be
uprooting the foundations of the Republic, an affront to its struggle against a
tyrannical government overseas.149 Justice Harlan’s dissent concluded with
an analogy comparing Congress to a creature of the Constitution. In his
view, Congress (the creature) could not possibly restrict the Constitution (the
creator) from the territories because Congress only managed to acquire those
possessions via the Constitution.150
Justice Harlan’s predictions became realities. Ruling after ruling, the
Court eroded the aspirational liberties Puerto Ricans hoped for post-SpanishAmerican War. Justice Harlan knew it from the Insular Cases’ inception:
What [Justice Harlan] saw in the Insular Cases, and no other
justice even alluded to, was the potential for exactly the kind of
divisions and hypocrisy that had fanned the flames of civil war:
the injustice of keeping some people in subservient conditions,
coupled with economic structures that grow up around such
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deprivations, and the simple tension of two systems existing
under one flag, adding up to a threat to the future of the nation.151
Twenty-two years after the Court’s decision in Downes, Puerto Rico
had one final appearance before the Court preceding a gradual period of
advancement in autonomy from the 1930s to the 1950s. The case, Balzac v.
Porto Rico, would be the straw that broke the camel’s back as a matter of
constitutional protection.152 The decision in Balzac was issued five years
after Puerto Ricans were granted United States citizenship by the JonesShafroth Act. With citizenship, the hurdles imposed by the Court and
Congress should have evaporated, as citizenship meant that they were
entitled to the same constitutional protections as their mainland
counterparts.153 But as the Balzac Court asserted, the claim that citizenship
yielded constitutional protections was chaffy; locality is what mattered.
Balzac v. Porto Rico began as a case of criminal libel against Jesús M.
Balzac of Puerto Rico.154 Puerto Rico’s criminal procedure code allocated a
jury trial in felony cases, but it reserved the right in misdemeanor cases.155
Mr. Balzac argued that, regardless of Puerto Rico’s code, the United States
Constitution’s Sixth Amendment’s jury trial guarantee superseded Puerto
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Rico’s code, thus affording him the right to a jury trial.156 Additionally, Mr.
Balzac alleged that the libel charges against him were frivolous under the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution.157 After the arguments
were rejected by both the trial court and the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico,
Mr. Balzac appealed to the United States Supreme Court.158
The Court considered whether the Sixth Amendment applied to Puerto
Rico.159 The Court relied on the Downes era jurisprudence apropos of the
applicability of the Constitution to the territories, which was surprising in
Puerto Rico’s situation, given that its inhabitants had been made American
citizens. Instead, according to the Court, the full application of the
Constitution depended on whether Puerto Rico had been incorporated by
Congress since it acquired the island in 1900.160 The Court examined the
Jones-Shafroth Act. Had Puerto Rico been incorporated? Had Congress
intended to incorporate it? The Court answered both in the negative and did
so by relying on the Act’s ambiguities regarding Puerto Rico’s status.161 Yet
the Court’s most vexing test was the locality doctrine: “It is locality that is
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determinative of the application of the Constitution, in such matters as
judicial procedure, and not the status of the people who live in it.”162
Overall, the Insular Cases caused Puerto Rico’s devolution to a time
reminiscent of Spanish rule. What can be distilled from the Insular Cases
are the following propositions: (1) Puerto Ricans are second-class citizens
when compared to those residing on the mainland; (2) The Constitution is
inapplicable in territories simply because they are unincorporated.
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VII. Puerto Rico’s Chance at a New Deal:
Advancement in the Polity and Public Law 600
Beginning in the 1930s, Puerto Rico started gaining more autonomy. This
was amidst a time of tumult, suffering, violence, and economic despair.163 On
top of the social issues consuming the island, Puerto Rican political parties
were undergoing rudimentary changes, such as the rise of the Partido
Popular Democrático (PPD) under the future Governor and the Free
Associated State’s founding father, Luis Muñoz Marín.164 While the Great
Depression ravaged the mainland, Puerto Rico was being consumed by a
mixture of violence and economic perils—a microcosm of the mainland.165
Unlike his predecessors, President Franklin D. Roosevelt sought to rescue the
island from financial pressures and put an end to the characteristic
indifference of years past. President Roosevelt addressed his “fellow friends
and citizens of Puerto Rico” from the island’s capital and identified the “social
and economic problems” in the island that would be met with “the same
methods that we use to solve them in other parts of the country.”166 A year
after President Roosevelt’s San Juan remarks, a prominent piece of New Deal
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legislation arrived on the island: the Puerto Rico Reconstruction
Administration (hereinafter PRRA).167 Through the PRRA, Puerto Rico saw
multiple recovery measures extended to it. These included a cooperative in
charge of a sugar mill’s operations (Central Lafayette) and the construction of
public works, including medical buildings, funds for education, and other
social and economic policies.168 While a prima facie examination of the PRRA
yields an air of New Deal success, the program was not free of criticism. As
proof, Connecticut Senator Chester Bowles’s assessment of the program in
1955:
For all that [the PRRA] accomplished as the local adjunct of the New Deal
in the nineteen thirties, [the PRRA] early demonstrated the ineffectiveness
of a rigid planning, which was benevolently prepared and supervised by a
government outside the immediate context of local needs. Thus a decade
ago Puerto Ricans learned a lesson which should now be a truism: that is
a people are to be saved from whatever danger threatens them, whether it
be the militant aggression of communism or the social scourge of poverty
and disease, they will in the last analysis save themselves through their
own indigenous power, pride and responsibility. If outsiders are to be
helpful, their help must take the form of friendly and unobtrusive
support.169
Similarly, the island’s last appointed Governor from the mainland and
President Roosevelt’s appointee, Rexford G. Tugwell, evaluated Puerto Rico’s
situation as the vestiges of colonialism, which “made beggars of honest men,
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168 See generally Burrows, The New Deal in Puerto Rico: Public Works, Public Health, and
the Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration, 1935-1955, CUNY Academic Works.
169 Trías Monge, supra note 1, at 97 (quoting statement from Senator Chester Bowles)
(citation omitted).
167

39

sycophants of cynics, American-haters of those who ought to have been
working beside us for world-betterment.”170 Governor Tugwell further
described that “[e]conomically it consisted in setting up things so that the
colony sold its raw products in a cheap market (in the mother country) and
bought its food and other finished goods in a dear market (also the mother
country).”171
While the vestiges of colonialism remained, wholly subscribing to these
criticisms of the New Deal programs would be foolish. As noted by Geoffrey
Burrows, “[the] PRRA public works projects made concrete contributions to
the physical security of millions of Puerto Ricans through the construction of
hurricane-proof houses, schools, hospitals, roads, sewers, waterworks, and
rural electrification networks.”172 Moving away from infrastructural
accomplishments, the PRRA had a deeper effect on Puerto Rico’s relationship
with Washington, D.C., since it placed the island, and its status, back on
Washington, D.C.’s radar and allowed for progress in the island’s status,
opening the doors for what was to follow in the 1940s and 1950s. As Geoffrey
Burrows wrote, “[the PRRA] not only made lasting contributions to local
social and economic life, [it] also had a transformative effect on Puerto Rican
politics during the 1940s and the meaning of U.S. citizenship for Puerto
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Ricans in the twentieth century and beyond.”173 Admittedly, the PRRA did
precipitously reduce the funds available to Puerto Rico, which culminated in
Congress ordering the Secretary of the Interior to cease the PRRA in 1955.174
The 1940s were transformative for Puerto Rico and its role within the
polity. For instance, Governor Tugwell had ambitious goals for the island,
which were followed with swift actions, including the reduction of the
bureaucracy within the bureaucracy that had become the offices of the
island’s Auditor and Attorney General, as well as removing powers which
they had unjustly seized.175 Tugwell also laid the groundwork for what was
to be the election of Puerto Rico’s Governor by Puerto Ricans. However, at
first, Tugwell’s goals remained ashore as President Roosevelt grappled with
the ongoing war in Europe and the Pacific.176 Moreover, Puerto Rico wanted
a definitive statement as to what its status would be postwar, especially
considering the Atlantic Charter, which included provisions for the colonies’
self-determination.177 As Puerto Rico’s status agitated the island more and
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more, Governor Tugwell wrote the Secretary of Interior, Harold Ickes, the
following desperate plea:
I have not been able to understand the prolonged delay in making any
statement about Puerto Rico’s status after the war. It is a more and
more embarrassing question. And if it is not handled pretty soon, it is
going to get mixed up in the political mess here. I should like to urge
that Interior send its recommendations for changes in the [Jones Act]
immediately on convening of the new Congress. This will clarify the
situation so far as I am concerned. And it will challenge the opposition
in Congress to do something besides snipe.178
Tugwell’s pleas alongside his influence on President Roosevelt culminated in
the creation of a commission that would explore the feasibility of a governor
elected by the island’s electorate;179 advancement in the island’s sovereignty.
Along with the creation of the exploratory commission came a communique
from President Roosevelt to Congress, urging Congress to “amend [the Jones
Act] so as to permit the people of Puerto Rico to elect their own governor and
to redefine the functions and power” of Puerto Rico.180
In 1943, the commission submitted a report with its findings. The
report recommended that Puerto Rico’s political status be addressed with no
further delay.181 Senator Tydings subsequently introduced a bill in the
United States Senate reflecting the commission’s report.182 The bill,
alongside the zeitgeist in the Senate regarding the island, reflected the
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change in rhetoric about Puerto Rico in Washington, D.C.183 However, the
bill with the commission’s recommendations faced a grim fate in the
House.184 But in 1947 a simpler bill gained approval; nearly fifty years after
the United States took control of the island, Puerto Rico could finally choose
its Governor.185 Congress, especially the House, wanted Puerto Ricans to
remain clear on one thing:
The changes which would be made by the enactment of H.R. 3309 would
not alter Puerto Rico’s political or fiscal relationship to the United
States. Congress does not surrender any of its constitutional authority
to legislate for Puerto Rico or to review insular laws. Neither would this
legislation prove an obstacle to a subsequent determination by the
Congress of the permanent political questions.186
Congress’s reprimand aside, the elective governor provision altered the
dynamic between the United States and Puerto Rico and did away with the
restrictive appointment provisions set by the Foraker and Jones-Shafroth
Acts. As Luis Muñoz Marín explained: “From now on, when the humble
Puerto Rican voter deposits his vote in the ballot box, that vote will have at
least three times more power than before.”187 Yet the climax of Puerto Rican
progress would occur later in the Truman presidency.
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Under President Truman’s turn at the helm, Puerto Rico was able to
gain new tracts of sovereignty, especially after the denunciation of colonial
holdings worldwide had intensified post-World War II. After signing the
elective governor bill into law, President Truman embarked on a more radical
gambit: redefining Puerto Rico’s status. Shortly after coming to the
presidency, President Truman delivered a special message to Congress:
It is the settled policy of this Government to promote the political, social
and economic development of people who have not yet attained full selfgovernment, and eventually to make it possible for them to determine
their own form of government.
It is our pride that this policy was faithfully pursued in the case of the
Philippines. The people of the Philippines determined that they desired
political independence, and the Government of the United States made
provision to this effect.
It is now time, in my opinion, to ascertain from the people of Puerto Rico
their wishes as to the ultimate status which they prefer, and, within
such limits as may be determined by the Congress, to grant to them the
kind of government which they desire.
The present form of government in the Island appears to be
unsatisfactory to many its inhabitants. Different groups of people in
Puerto Rico are advocating various changes in the present form of
government.
These advocated changes include different possibilities: (1) the right of
the Puerto Ricans to elect their own Governor with a wider measure of
local self-government; (2) Statehood for Puerto Rico; (3) complete
independence; and (4) a Dominion form of government.188
The cornerstone for this constitutional revolution began when Senator
Tydings and Resident Commissioner Piñero joined forces and introduced a
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referendum that would check the pulse of Puerto Rico’s status preference.189
The three status options on the bill were statehood, independence, and an
“Associated State or a dominion.”190 The Tydings-Piñero comprehensive bill
with status options met its demise without seeing the light of day out of
committee.191 But the ill-fated bill provided three parts that would inspire
Public Law 600—the law that would bring Puerto Rico’s control over its
internal affairs to its apex. The components were the following: (1) it tried to
affirm Puerto Rican’s right to self-government via a constitution of their
drafting;192 (2) it leveled the power dynamics between the United States and
Puerto Rico;193 (3) it was designed to implement the alterations necessary to
achieve the second part.194
With the debacle of the Tydings-Piñero bill aside, and after securing a
hefty victory in the 1948 elections, Luis Muñoz Marín and the PPD went to
work to create the stem cells for Public Law 600.195 After many internal
debates and deliberations, the Resident Commissioner submitted the
legislation to Congress.196 In the grand scheme of things, the proposed
legislation called for the “establishment of a constitutional government for
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the island.”197 Simply put, the legislation pressed for Puerto Rico to have
more control of its internal affairs, similar to that control possessed by a
State, but subject to larger restrictions.198 This move aimed to reallocate part
of Congress’s mammoth power over the island to Puerto Rico itself,
specifically the control over its internal affairs. Congress and President
Truman approved the measure and entered into a “compact” with Puerto Rico
“so that the people of Puerto Rico may organize a government pursuant to a
constitution of their own adoption.”199 However, the compact was not free
from Congress’s reservations, such as the ability to circumvent the Puerto
Rican Constitution or annul laws ratified by the island’s legislature and
signed by its Governor.200 In other words, despite Puerto Rico’s
advancements, Congress retained its plenary powers in full. Finally, in 1952,
the law was enshrined in the annals of American political and legal history.
When delivered to President Truman’s desk, the President signed the
measure approving the constitution and delivered the following remarks:
The constitution approved by the constitutional convention was
submitted to the people of Puerto Rico in a referendum on March 3,
1952, and was approved by an overwhelming majority. On April 22,
1952, I transmitted the constitution to the Congress for approval in
accordance with the provisions of the act of July 3, 1950. The
Martin J. Collo, The Legislative History of Colonialism: Puerto Rico and the United States
Congress, 1950 to 1990, 13 J. THIRD WORLD STUD. 215, 217 (1996).
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constitution will now become effective upon the acceptance by the
constitutional convention of the conditions of approval and the issuance
of
a
proclamation
by
the
Governor
of
Puerto
Rico.
[The Puerto Rican Constitution] is the culmination of a consistent policy
of the United States to confer an ever-increasing measure of local selfgovernment upon the people of Puerto Rico. It provides additional
evidence of this Nation's adherence to the principle of self-determination
and
to
the
ideals
of
freedom
and
democracy.
We take special pride in the fact that this constitution is the product of
the people of Puerto Rico. When the Constitution of the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico is proclaimed by the Governor, Puerto Rico will have a
government fashioned by the people of Puerto Rico to meet their own
needs,
requirements,
and
aspirations.
With the approval of [the Commonwealth’s Constitution] the people of
the United States and the people of Puerto Rico are about to enter into
a relationship based on mutual consent and esteem. The Constitution of
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the procedures by which it has
come into being are matters of which every American can be justly
proud. They are in accordance with principles we proclaim as the right
of free peoples everywhere. July 3, 1952, should be a proud and happy
day for all who have been associated in a great task.201
With that, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico was born. Some consider
the constitution to be nothing more than a mirage, others deem it
insufficient,202 but it must be said that since 1952 and the Truman
Presidency, Puerto Rico has been left in a state of neglect and indifference.
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Moreover, the ebb and flow that is Puerto Rico’s progress in sovereignty
reached its apogee when the Commonwealth’s Constitution was adopted.
Could the measures pushing for self-government have done more?
Absolutely. As will be explored in a later section, the United States has
several options regarding Puerto Rico that should be adopted, especially after
key developments in 2016 that dealt heavy blows to Puerto Rico’s sovereignty
and subverted its standing in the polity. However, at the same time, it must
be conceded that the grant of the constitution toppled those restraints Puerto
Rico endured during Spanish times as well as the harsher measures it
incurred during its early days under Congress’s auspices. In other words,
President Truman’s grandiose aims regarding Puerto Rico’s self-governing
powers were, for the most part, fallacious.
What is more, after the ratification of Public Law 600 and the
enactment of the Puerto Rico Constitution, the United Nations removed
Puerto Rico from the category of “non-self-governing” territories,
underscoring those ambitious, self-governing goals at the center of Public
Law 600.203 But this international autonomous recognition, as well as
domestic approaches to Public Law 600, obfuscated rather than clarified the
nascent Commonwealth’s standing. Even years after the ratification of the

Gary Lawson & Robert D. Sloane, The Constitutionality of Decolonization by Associated
Statehood: Puerto Rico's Legal Status Reconsidered, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1123, 1126 (2009).
203

48

Puerto Rico Constitution and commonwealth designation, those in
Government were befuddled over what exactly was meant by the new status.
For example, Attorney General Richard Thornburgh stated that “[the]
Constitution knows only the mutually exclusive categories of ‘State’ and
‘Territory.’”204 Some even argue that the term Commonwealth “remains,
domestically, just another territory subject to Congress's plenary power
under the Territor[y] Clause.”205 As will be further evinced by court decisions
and commentary on the Puerto Rico Constitution at the time of its
enactment, there were several ambiguities with the island’s new label,
proving the authors’ claims right to an extent.
However, before further explicating Public Law 600’s deficiencies, the
constitution-making process, a first of its kind, an experiment, was the apex
of Puerto Rico’s sovereignty and autonomy. Even though the experiment was
not finished, even though it had its downfalls, its primordial benevolent and
lofty intentions were meant to forge a consensual bond between the Federal
Government and Puerto Rico. Dr. Antonio Fernós-Isern, the island’s
Resident Commissioner from 1946 to 1965, wrote that Public Law 600 and
the Constitution that ensued replaced Puerto Rico’s belonging “within [the
Spanish] monarchical system whose political institutions could not escape the
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effect of the decay and ruin into which the old realm had fallen” with a
relationship endowed with “equality, dignity, and security within the great
republican system of freedom, democracy, opportunity, and security of the
United States of America.”206 Further, Governor Luis Muñoz Marín lauded
the experiment as one that superseded the “divisive and futile debate on
status” and instead disenthralled the “long-repressed political energy of
[Puerto Ricans].”207 In turn, “a new form of status, a new form of political
relationship in the American Union and in all America, a new form of
political freedom in harmony with the economic freedom of [Puerto Ricans]
was born.”208 Even so, Governor Luis Muñoz Marín’s Nostradamic
prognostications were tainted with doubt: “It should be made clear that what
we have done has been to initiate a process of political creation in Puerto Rico
( … ) Precisely because it needs to grow in so many phases ( … ) [Puerto Rico]
must use its energy in [its] development and continuous growth.”209 The
doubts became realities, especially in 2016.
Like Mary Shelley’s Victor Frankenstein, the Federal Government
abandoned its experiment and did not provide methods for further
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advancement.210 As will be explained in detail in sections regarding 2016
and its aftershocks, Public Law 600’s and the Puerto Rico Constitution’s goals
were left in the lab and its doors closed.
Yet these 1950 to 1952 constitutional experimentations provided a
glimpse into what could have been but never was: a window into utilizing the
Territory Clause for effecting self-governing change.
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VIII. In Re Insular Cases
For all purposes, the Insular Cases are still good law and remain an
impediment to Puerto Rico’s sovereignty and equal participation in the
United States’ political process. Moreover, Congress’s untrammeled
authority over Puerto Rico is predicated on the holdings of the Insular Cases.
The Insular Cases remain stranded on their own island, or stomping an
island, rather. With that, this chapter will discuss how the Court has
implicitly overruled these cases, even if the judiciary has, for inexplicable
reasons, found a way to avoid confrontation with the Insular Cases.
The revisitation of the Insular Cases will proceed with three key cases
succeeding the early 1900s jurisprudence. These three cases will help
address the following concerns: First, the question of the extraterritorial
application of the Constitution, that is, whether the Supreme Court has
indicated that the Constitution now applies beyond its borders more robustly
than that set by the Insular Cases. This principle has been addressed by two
cases: Reid v. Covert and Boumediene v. Bush. Second, the question of
Puerto Rico’s incorporation into the polity, or whether the legislative or
judicial findings evince the removal of Puerto Rico from the unincorporated
territory category. For this analysis, the focus will be on Examining Bd. of
Engineers, Architects, and Surveyors v. Flores de Otero. The goal of this
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reinspection of the Insular Cases is to eradicate one of the largest roadblocks
to Puerto Rico’s sovereignty within the United States.

A. The Constitution Goes Abroad
The Supreme Court sealed Puerto Rico’s chance at the full applicability of
the Constitution on the island in 1922. Chief Justice Taft, speaking for the
Court, made the pronouncement that the only determinative factor regarding
the Constitution’s application is the location of the citizens.211 But thirty-five
years after that fateful decision, the Court abrogated the locality doctrine.
Instead, the Court focused on more practical considerations as related to the
applicability question. In short, the query will turn to both the locality and
citizenship status of the affected individuals.
1. Reid v. Covert
Colloquially reduced to the epithet of the “murdering wives’” case, Reid
v. Covert “raise[d] basic constitutional issues of the utmost concern.”212
The concern was whether civilians—the wives of servicemembers—could
be tried by courts-martial outside the United States for the murder of
their husbands, thus “depriving them of trial in civilian courts, under
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civilian laws and procedures and with all the safeguards of the Bill of
Rights.”213
Clarice Covert, one of the parties, had killed her husband, an Air Force
non-commissioned officer.214 Although she was not a servicemember, she
had been residing with her husband on a United States military base in
Britain at the time of the murder.215 Mrs. Covert was brought before and
tried by a court-martial composed of servicemembers.216 She was found
guilty and sentenced to spend life in prison.217
Dorothy Smith, a co-party to Mrs. Covert, also killed her husband, a
United States Army colonel, on a United States Army base in Japan.218
Like Mrs. Covert, Mrs. Smith was tried and sentenced by a court-martial,
which found her guilty and set her to face a life sentence.219
After the two cases were consolidated, the Court initially held that the
use of courts-martial as the fora for the trial of the two civilians was
constitutional, since “the provisions of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments which require that crimes be tried by a jury after indictment
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( … ) did not protect an American citizen when he was tried by the
[Government] in foreign lands for offenses committed there.”220 Further,
the Court included that “Congress could provide for the trial of such
offenses in any manner it saw fit so long as the procedures established
were reasonable and consonant with due process.”221 Ultimately, the
Court relied on Article I which vested the power “[t]o make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces”222 in Congress.
Of course, this once again was related to Congress’s plenary authority
over certain policymaking and regulatory areas such as the
administration of territories. The Court authorized rehearing and,
remarkably, changed its mind.
From the start, the Court made it clear that it repudiated “the idea
that when the United States acts against citizens abroad it can do so free
of the Bill of Rights.”223 Most damningly, the Court indicted the United
States of overstepping the bounds imposed by the Constitution, as the
“United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution.”224 And to
bulldoze the holding of Balzac, the Court did not mince words when it
stated that “the shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the
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Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty should not be stripped
away just because [individuals] happen[] to be in another land.”225 As to
the doctrine of selective incorporation of only fundamental rights
established by the Insular Cases, the Court asserted that It “f[ou]nd no
warrant, in logic or otherwise, for picking and choosing among the
remarkable collection of ‘Thou shalt nots’ which were explicitly fastened
on all departments and agencies of the Federal Government by the
Constitution and its Amendments.”226 Yet the Court did not go as far as
to explicitly overrule the holdings of the Insular Cases but rather
distinguished them from Reid because “[the Insular Cases] involved the
power of Congress to provide rules and regulations to govern temporarily
territories with wholly dissimilar traditions and institutions whereas here
the basis for governmental power is American citizenship.”227 But the
Court simultaneously refused to extend the principles of the Insular Cases
and cautioned that a “blending of executive, legislative, and judicial
powers in one person or even in one branch of the Government”228 as well
as bypassing the Constitution merely because it is inconvenient to apply
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it, is antithetical to the basic framework of the Constitution and the ideals
of limited Government.229
Similarly, the Court described that when confronted with a treaty, the
Constitution’s supremacy prevails.230 This is reminiscent of the Treaty of
Paris’s provision allocating the power to determine Puerto Ricans’ political
and civil rights to Congress.231 To top the indictment against an
omnipotent Government with aspirations to selectively apply the
Constitution to United States citizens abroad, the Court announced that
“[t]he mere fact that these women had gone overseas ( … ) should not
reduce the protection the Constitution gives them.”232 The wives’
convictions were overturned.
Parallels to the Puerto Rican situation are scattered throughout this
case. For example, Congress effectively behaves, for the most part, as the
sole organ with jurisdiction over Puerto Rico, for it is granted the most
power to deal with territories by not just the Territory Clause, but by the
Court and the Executive. Likewise, Congress possesses plenary powers
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over the regulation of the Armed Forces. In Reid, like Balzac before it, the
Petitioners were being refused their constitutional rights based on
locality, and yet the Reid Court refused to apply the Balzac doctrine,
extending constitutional protections to United States citizens located
across the globe. Congress has relied on the Insular Cases and the Treaty
of Paris to justify the indifference, disparate treatment, and near
abandonment of its citizens in Puerto Rico. But Congress would run into
the halt placed by the Reid Court if the Court so desired: “It would be
completely anomalous to say that a treaty need not comply with the
Constitution when such an agreement can be overridden by a statute that
must conform to that instrument.”233 In short, although the Court may
have not explicitly overruled the Insular Cases in Reid, it merely needed
to add a few words to do so. It then follows that Reid significantly eroded
the foundations of the anachronistic decisions, but as the Roberts Court
would confirm in Boumediene, the Insular Cases are nothing if not an
obsolete reliquial series of cases.
2. Boumediene v. Bush
Fifty-one years after the monumental decision in Reid, the Court again
faced the extraterritorial application question. However, this time it did
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not deal with American citizens abroad but with enemy combatants
detained in Cuba, seven years into the so-called “War on Terror” following
the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States. The central
question was whether the detainees in Guantanamo Bay qualified to
receive judicial relief through the Writ of Habeas Corpus.234
Congress’s enactment of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 provided
that “no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider
( … ) an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an
alien detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba.”235 The Government’s arguments advanced with the claim that
enemy combatants who were not citizens and were detained in
Guantanamo Bay—which was outside the United States’ borders—were
not subject to constitutional privileges or habeas relief.236
After a historical review of the Great Writ’s existence and development
in England and the United States, the Court proceeded by, again,
distinguishing between the Insular Cases and Boumediene. According to
the Court, the Constitution’s application in the Insular Cases was
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predicated on practical concerns given Puerto Rico’s unfamiliarity with
Anglo-Saxon legal traditions and practices, as well as the use of civil law
over the common law: “Yet noting the inherent practical difficulties of
enforcing all constitutional provisions ‘always and everywhere,’ the Court
devised in the Insular Cases a doctrine that allowed it to use its power
sparingly and where it would be most needed.”237 This test is
characterized as the “impracticable and anomalous” test.238 But this
sweeping characterization of the Insular Cases is misguided, as the Court
a few pages afterward went on to say that although the Constitution may
permit territorial acquisition, it does not follow that political branches get
to decide where and when the instrument applies.239 This is a manifest
contradiction by the Court. What is more, the Court followed the charges
against the political branches with the Boumediene principle: “To hold
the political branches have the power to switch the Constitution on or off
at will is another.”240 Because of this, the enemy combatants could seek
habeas relief in federal courts. This stupefied the Government, as it had
relied on the Court’s precedent set by Eisentrager v. United States,
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wherein the Court refused to grant German prisoners access to the Great
Writ given their designation of non-nationals.241 Further, the Eisentrager
Court made the crucial distinction between a citizen and a non-citizen,
particularly enemy combatants: “Citizenship as a head of jurisdiction and
a ground of protection was old when Paul invoked it in his appeal to
Caesar. The years have not destroyed nor diminished the importance of
citizenship nor have they sapped the vitality of a citizen's claims upon his
government for protection.”242 Also, the Eisentrager Court simultaneously
destroyed the Balzac locality doctrine and exalted the meaning of
citizenship vis-à-vis constitutional protections: “If a person's claim to
United States citizenship is denied by any official, Congress has directed
our courts to entertain his action to declare him to be a citizen ‘regardless
of whether he is within the United States or abroad.’”243
But why is the Court hesitant to hold that Puerto Rico—a United
States Territory populated by 3 million American citizens244—is endowed
with the full protections of the Constitution? Rather, why is the Court so
blasé about relegating millions of American citizens in Puerto Rico to a
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status inferior to enemy combatants and abandoning the views espoused
by the Eisentrager Court? This is not to dispute the decision in
Boumediene, for it is proper that the political branches be reined in when
operating in an extraconstitutional state. But as will be explored next, it
is a dangerous approach to constitutional applicability and Puerto Rico
has suffered because of it.
3. Reid, Boumediene, and Their Shortcomings
As earlier stated, in Reid, Justice Black’s plurality opinion sought to
repudiate the Insular Cases. Yet the Court stopped short of declaring
that these cases were obsolete, as Justice Black’s opinion did not garner
enough support. One of the concurrences—Justice John Marshall Harlan
II’s—has outlasted Justice Black’s constitutional application ideas.245
Justice Harlan II’s outlook rested on the following teachings from the
Insular Cases:
The proposition is, of course, not that the Constitution “does not apply”
overseas, but that there are provisions in the Constitution which do not
necessarily apply in all circumstances in every foreign place. In other
words, it seems to me that the basic teaching of ( … ) the Insular Cases
is that there is no rigid and abstract rule that Congress, as a condition
precedent to exercising power over Americans overseas, must exercise it
subject to all the guarantees of the Constitution, no matter what the
conditions and considerations are that would make adherence to a
specific guarantee altogether impracticable and anomalous … In other
words, what ( … ) the Insular Cases hold is that the particular local

245

Burnett, supra note 238, at 998.

62

setting, the practical necessities, and the possible alternatives are
relevant ….246
Dr. Burnett argues that Justice Harlan’s approach balked in making the
distinction “between applicability and enforceability of constitutional
guarantees,” and in so doing “subjected the question of applicability to an
analysis driven entirely by consequentialist concerns” as the Court would
later employ in Boumediene.247
Launching off Justice Harlan II’s concurrence in Reid, the Boumediene
Court utilized his approach to determine whether the enemy combatants
detained in Guantanamo were eligible for habeas relief. The Court
considered a multi-factor test consisting of citizenship and status, the
degree of control the United States exercised over the domain
(sovereignty), and whether there were any “practical obstacles” that would
prevent the application of relief, that is, the constitutional protection.248
To rebuff this open-ended, hazy method of the Constitution’s applicability,
Dr. Burnett proposes a solution rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment and
specific case law gleaned from the Amendment’s provisions.249 More
precisely, this counter to the Court’s balancing test outlook deals with the
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incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the States.250 Moreover, the
proposed test boils down to whether a specific constitutional provision
applies and if so, how.251 Instead of Boumediene’s “anomalous and
practical test,” the Court would have inquired on the United States’
sovereignty over Guantanamo, the historical application of the Great
Writ’s Suspension Clause, and other important constitutional
provisions.252 When examined, the Boumediene Court would have arrived
at the same holding, because the United States exerts de facto sovereignty
over Guantanamo. Consequently, the Suspension Clause is not limited by
geographical boundaries, and there is proof that the Great Writ had been
applied abroad before the Boumediene decision.253 This new method
would have curbed the flaw in the Court’s balancing test: its reliance on
“abstract and hypothetical concerns.”254 And to answer the dissent’s
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Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated
the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination in the States); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (holding that Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial was
incorporated into the States via the Fourteenth Amendment); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784 (1969) (holding that the Eighth Amendment’s protection against double jeopardy was
incorporated into the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment).
251 Id. at 1032 (“[T]he whether stage [consists] of a determination of what constitutional
provisions authorize the power being exercised, and what constitutional provisions limit it.
[Then], when the whether question has been answered affirmatively and the relevant
constitutional provisions identified, a court should determine how a provision [held
applicable] (…) shall be vindicated …”).
252 Id. at 1032-33.
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question of who won in the Court’s decision255 would have included not
just Petitioners in the case but American citizens in the territories as well.

B. To Be Incorporated, or Not to Be, That Is the Over CenturyOld Question
In tandem with the question of the Constitution’s application comes
the question of whether Puerto Rico remains as a “disembodied shade, in
an intermediate state of ambiguous existence”256 in the manner of an
unincorporated territory. The issue of incorporation is imperative to the
Puerto Rican sovereignty question for the Court has held that what
inhibits Puerto Rico’s access to all the blessings of liberty lies in
Congress’s refusal to incorporate the territory.257 The analysis in this
next section will focus on whether Puerto Rico’s incorporation (either
implicit or explicit) is evinced by an Act of Congress or by any of the
Court’s rulings. Under consideration comes Examining Bd. of Engineers,
Architects, and Surveyors v. Flores de Otero. This narrow investigation
will focus on any language, indication, or development emanating from
these two authorities that speak, either in affirmance or denial, of Puerto
Rico’s territorial status. While one might be tempted to foreclose the
argument based on Balzac’s statement that even citizenship was not
Id. (“So who has won? Not the detainees ( … ) Not Congress ( … ) Not the Great Writ ( …
) And certainly not the American people …”).
256 Downes, 182 U.S. at 372 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
257 E.g., Id.; Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Balzac, 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
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enough to consider Puerto Rico an incorporated territory, it would be
irresponsible to eschew examination of developments in the law since
1922.
1. Examining Bd. of Engineers, Architects, and Surveyors v. Flores de
Otero
In Examining Bd. of Engineers, Architects, and Surveyors v. Flores de
Otero, the Court considered two issues: whether the United States
District Court for the District of Puerto Rico had jurisdiction—granted
under the United States Code provision dealing with the process required
when civil rights are violated258—to hear 1983 civil rights cases,259 and
whether a Puerto Rico statute limiting civil engineering licenses to United
States citizens was constitutional.260 After Maria C. Flores de Otero had
applied for said license, she was denied said license by Puerto Rico’s
Examining Board of Engineers, Architects, and Surveyors.261 Along with
Ms. Flores de Otero was Sergio Perez Nogueiro, who was also a
noncitizen.262 In Mr. Perez Nogueiro’s complaint, he alleged that the
denial of licensure infracted the Due Process Clause of either the Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendments.263 The United States District Court for the

28 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (West).
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West).
260 Examining Bd. of Engineers, Architects and Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572
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District of Puerto Rico granted relief and instructed the Board to license
the individuals.264 The Board appealed.265 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari.266
The Court examined the statutes and their histories, specifically
Congress’s 1874 addition of the phrase “or Territory” to their statute of
origin: the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871.267 On the jurisdiction question, the
Court answered that the district court had jurisdiction.268 As to the
question related to §1983, the Court also answered that the district court
had jurisdiction to hear complaints and grant relief since the purpose of
commonwealth status for Puerto Rico was to “accord [the island] the
degree of autonomy and independence normally associated with States of
the Union.”269 The Court also noted that Puerto Rico’s relationship with
the United States is sui generis, with “no parallel in our history.”270 As to
the overall question regarding Puerto Rico’s ban on “aliens” being licensed
as engineers, the Court found that “[i]t [was] clear ( … ) that the
protections accorded by either the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment or the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the

Id. at 580.
Id.
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267 Id. at 581 (citation omitted).
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Fourteenth Amendment appl[ied] to Puerto Rico.”271 But the Court did
not know whether the applicable clauses came from the Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendments.272 Lacking an answer to which Amendment
applied, the Court went on to employ strict scrutiny in examining the
Puerto Rico statute and annulled the same.273
Two logical implications arise from the Court’s decision. First, either
Puerto Rico is equal to a State when speaking of constitutional provisions
that apply on the island, or it is something else. Second, if the first
proposition is veridic, then Puerto Rico has been incorporated into the
United States. From this, it follows that the lack of equal representation
in Congress, the denial of suffrage rights for the island, and the lack of
full constitutional protections are incoherent with the Court’s
pronouncements. But this has not been the situation.
As will be evinced by the Court’s decisions in 2016, the Court has
abstained from expounding on that degree of autonomy afforded to Puerto
Rico by the commonwealth status: “[B]oth decisions treated Puerto Rico’s
fundamental constitutional transformation after 1950 as nothing more
than a data point—and sometimes an irrelevant one—in the interpretive
task at hand.”274 In a later section, the effects these decisions have had on

Id. at 600.
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Puerto Rico’s alleged State-like sovereignty will be further explored and
explained.
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IX. Prelude to 2016: A Tumultuous Time
It would be impractical to relate the entirety of events leading up to
the actions by the Court, the Executive, and Congress in 2016. Instead, it
is apt to focus on the happenings that precipitated governmental actions.
Most of these developments dealt with Puerto Rico’s precarious financial
situation, but they also include key legal and political occurrences.
Overall, the two main actors will continue to be Congress and the Court,
while the Executive will play a supporting role. Moreover, one will take
notice of Puerto Rico’s devolution in autonomy and sovereignty.

A. The Economic Front
This detective work begins with § 936 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1976. This law provided a tax exemption for companies in the mainland
to invest in Puerto Rico.275 Major companies, like Johnson & Johnson,
took advantage of the tax haven, as § 936 provided heightened incentives
for companies who “could show the vast majority of their income was
derived from sources in a ‘possession.’”276 Companies were enthralled by
the incentives, and through corporate inventiveness or avarice, they
managed to move practically everything to the tax shelter Puerto Rico had

Juan R. Torruella, Outstanding Constitutional and International Law Issues Raised by the
United States-Puerto Rico Relationship, 100 MINN. L. REV. Headnotes 79, 94 (2016).
276 Id.
275
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become, including “production, patents, and trademarks.”277 Congress lost
over $3 billion in taxes because of the corporations’ gambit.278 The
corporations’ actions were devastating to the intended goal of § 936, which
was to develop Puerto Rico’s economy through job creation.279 Congress
wanted to put a stoppage to the lost revenue and thus decided to entirely
repeal § 936 in 1996 without first testing intermediary steps.280 The
companies retaliated and left Puerto Rico, creating an economic vacuum
that sent thousands to unemployment while simultaneously punting the
economy into its demise.281
Contributing to Puerto Rico’s economic downturn is the dangerous
trade dependency Puerto Rico has on the mainland. For instance, close to
90% of Puerto Rico’s exports are destined for the mainland’s markets,
making Puerto Rico the Nation’s largest contributor of wealth as well as
the chief “captive market” of mainland goods.282 In turn, the Government
is eager to subsidize industries, but the subsidies are equivalent to giving
money to one’s sibling so they can purchase lemonade from one’s
lemonade stand, as the subsidies are “repatriated when Puerto Ricans buy

Id. at 95.
Id.
279 Id. at 94.
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282 Torruella, supra note 261, at 95-6.
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Mainland-made products” with the subsidies.283 To offset these economic
debilities, Puerto Rico engaged in an addictive bond-issuing practice.
Indeed, the island started issuing triple-tax exempt bonds to become the
sultriest investment location.284 Investors flocked the island. Puerto Rico
needed to keep its projects and itself afloat, hence the continued issuing of
debt.285 But Puerto Rico “took out long-term debt to cover short-term
financial needs.”286 With the repeal of § 936, the island’s economy was set
for a cataclysmic meltdown. To make matters worse, Puerto Rico was
“experiencing steady population loss and very low productivity.”287 The
island’s mass exodus—a “brain drain”—as well as its economy’s volatility,
combined to make a gargantuan recipe for disaster.
Then came the disparity in federal benefits. Puerto Rico receives a
minuscule share of Medicaid and Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
benefits.288 More specifically, when speaking of Medicaid, Puerto Rico
received a smaller share of the funding compared to States that have

Id.
Francesca Trianni & Ellie Ismailidou, The Next Financial Crisis You Haven’t Heard About
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equal or smaller populations.289 There is no good reason for Puerto Rico’s
exclusion other than the Insular Cases’ deference to Congress, even if the
island’s residents would eligible on the mainland.290 Puerto Rico’s already
handicapped local government is then burdened with covering the rest.
What is more, the Supreme Court has greenlit this difference in
treatment. As explained in Califano v. Torres, “[c]ertain benefits under
the Social Security Act, as amended in 1972, are payable only to residents
of the United States, defined as the 50 States and the District of
Columbia.”291 The Court refused to further scrutinize the exclusion and
subjected it to rational basis review.292 Then came Harris v. Rosario,
wherein the Court upheld different funding for federal programs on the
island, holding that the Territory Clause empowered Congress to treat
Puerto Rico differently, yet again: “Congress…may treat Puerto Rico
differently from States so long as there is a rational basis for its
actions.”293 Next, the Court examined Congress’s reasons for doing so: (1)
“Puerto Rican residents do not contribute to the federal treasury;” (2) “the
cost of treating Puerto Rico as a State under the statute would be high;”

Torruella, supra note 261, at 97.
See note 137.
291 435 U.S. 1 (1978) (per curiam).
292 Id. at 5 (“Such a statute ‘is entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality.’ ‘So long
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(3) “greater benefits could disrupt the Puerto Rican economy.”294 This was
a setback for the Commonwealth. In dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall
sought to point out the majority’s reasoning flaws. First, the majority had
no reason for claiming that the Territory Clause provided Congress a free
license to discriminate against Puerto Rico.295 Next, Justice Marshall
took issue with the Insular Cases. Justice Marshall believed that those
decisions were “questionable,” especially since the Court had held that the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses applied on the island.296
Lastly, Justice Marshall confronted the majority’s logic about the benefits
disturbing the economy: “This rationale has troubling overtones. It
suggests that programs designed to help the poor should be less fully
applied in those areas where the need may be greatest, simply because
otherwise the relative poverty of recipients compared to other persons in
the same geographic area will somehow be upset.”297 Significant economic
disparities aside, the Court’s per curiam opinion in Rosario unlocked the
door for what was to become the decline of Puerto Rico’s sovereignty. It
also let Congress take back the reins over Puerto Rico’s internal affairs,
inconsistent with Public Law 600’s goal of enhancing Puerto Rico’s
autonomy, for nothing is more internal than a people’s economy.
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Making matters worse was a 1984 amendment to House Resolution
5174, aimed at overhauling the United States bankruptcy courts.298 This
amendment prevented Puerto Rico from declaring Chapter 9 bankruptcy.
Chapter 9 bankruptcy is the “part of the bankruptcy code for insolvent
local governments.”299 There is no rhyme or reason for this exemption.300
What came from this exception was that Puerto Rico’s $70-plus billion
debt had nowhere to go.301 Instead, Puerto Rico and the American citizens
therein were left to fare for themselves. This is like an individual’s house
being on fire but preventing them from calling on those able to extinguish
it.
The struggle for debt restructuring would end up at the Supreme
Court. It is one of the two 2016 Court decisions, detailed below, that
would deal heavy, repetitive blows to Puerto Rico’s sovereignty and
standing within the polity.

Jon Greenberg, Mystery: Strom Thurmond, Puerto Rico and bankruptcy protection,
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B. Shortcomings of the Politico-Legal Processes
After Puerto Rico enacted its constitution in 1952, it was thought that
the procedure would enter Puerto Rico on a path set for a “different”
status. The arrangement was deemed an “achievement in the politicolegal relations between Puerto Rico and the mainland.”302 This point has
some merit since legislation regarding Puerto Rico before Public Law 600,
including the Foraker and Jones-Shafroth Acts, were imposed on the
island rather than letting the island decide. However, Public Law 600
was subject to the island’s electorate in the form of a plebiscite vote.303
But unfortunately, the apex for sovereignty quickly subsided, as the
“compact” entered by both the mainland and Puerto Rico can be altered by
future Congresses.304 Precisely, as has been described in the above
sections, the vicissitudes in policies toward Puerto Rico have made that
compact subject to the whims of different Congresses. It then follows that
the compact is more of an arrangement rather than a true, fixed compact.
Not just this, but even in 1952, the question of whether Congress could
unilaterally repeal Puerto Rico’s constitution was up in the ether.305

Peter J. Fliess, Puerto Rico’s Political Status Under Its New Constitution, 5 THE WESTERN
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Besides Public Law 600’s obfuscations regarding the equilibrium between
Congress and Puerto Rico, it is also very important to mention the
obvious: Although it was a law made to enhance Puerto Rico’s control
over internal affairs, it refused to grant Puerto Rico representation in
Congress or federal voting rights ipso facto leaving Puerto Rico’s standing
in the general polity untouched and unenhanced. In effect, the
ambiguities surrounding Public Law 600 and the commonwealth label are
some of the major obstacles for Puerto Rico.
1. What is the Commonwealth’s Constitution?
Some claim that Congress cannot repeal Puerto Rico’s Constitution
bestowed upon the island by Public Law 600 while also claiming that the
law provided Puerto Rico with “state-like sovereignty.”306 However, this
would be reaching a premature conclusion, as Congress’s plenary
powers—set by the Territory Clause—remained intact after Public Law
600. On top of that, Puerto Rico’s Constitution did not wholly receive its
powers from the Government.307 Again, this is antithetical to Congress’s
full power over Puerto Rico’s fate within the polity. To answer the repeal
question, Congress does have the power to repeal, making Public Law 600

Adam W. McCall, Why Congress Cannot Unilaterally Repeal Puerto Rico's Constitution,
102 CORNELL L. REV. 1367, 1376 (2017).
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a measure to increase the island’s management over its local affairs while
offering no recompense to Puerto Rico’s standing comparable to that of the
States. The most light shed on this new status came via an opinion issued
by the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico merely
a year after the adoption of the constitution as well as commonwealth
status. In Mora v. Torres, the district court acknowledged the time-old
tale that a “new type of relationship” had been born out of the
commonwealth and constitution.308 Aside from that, the district court
explicated that “[Puerto Rico] is no longer an agency of the Government of
the United States nor does it exercise any longer its powers by way of
delegation of the Federal Government. It is not now a dependency,
possession nor territory of the United States.”309 The district court also
said that the Puerto Rican Constitution could not be unilaterally repealed
by either side, as it was anathema to the pactum Public Law 600 was
meant to be.310 Adding to the premature premonitions, the district court
stated that “Puerto Rico enjoy[ed] the total substance of self government
[sic] and there is a plentitude of government by consent, which realities

Mora v. Torres, 113 F. Supp. 309, 313 (D.P.R.), aff'd sub nom. Mora v. Mejias, 206 F.2d
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are incompatible with the previous status of Puerto Rico as a possession,
dependency or territory.”311 And though the First Circuit Court of
Appeals may have reaffirmed the lower court’s ruling,312 the Court failed
to substantially elaborate on these asseverations until 2016.313
2. On Voting Rights
The courts have foreclosed the arguments made for voting rights and
meaningful representation rather quickly. In Igartúa-De la Rosa v.
United States, the First Circuit Court of Appeals rejected arguments made
in favor of Puerto Ricans’ right to vote in the federal election.314 The
arguments in favor were grounded in the Constitution, international
treaties entered by the United States advocating for human rights, and
customary international law.315 The First Circuit rejected all three. To
answer the first argument, the First Circuit held that the constitutional
clause governing participation in the General Election deals with electors,
not citizens and that Puerto Rico has not been granted any electors,
unlike the District of Columbia.316 Then the First Circuit repudiated the
treaty argument, as the Constitution remained the supreme law of the
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land: “The case for giving Puerto Ricans the right to vote in presidential
elections is fundamentally a political one and must be made through
political means. But the right claimed cannot be implemented by courts
unless Puerto Rico becomes a state or until the Constitution is
changed.”317 And to bless the notion that treaties could not supersede the
Constitution, the First Circuit said that the right to vote ought not “‘be
declared’ by a federal court on the basis of treaties none of which was
designed to alter domestic law—and none of which could override the
Constitution.”318 In terms of the last argument, whether customary
international law exerted upon the United States an obligation to
enfranchise American citizens in Puerto Rico, the First Circuit said that
though “some enthusiasts [deem customary law] to be law like other law,”
it was an “uncertain body of norms” with a varying degree of
“enforceability…even in the international sphere.”319 In sum, the
customary law claim did not hold water.320 The Supreme Court declined
to grant certiorari to resolve such an important question.321
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The question of purposeful representation for the island’s American
citizens was resolved in Igartúa v. United States.322 There, the central
argument in favor of congressional representation was Puerto Ricans’
status as United States citizens. But the Court distinguished this as not
being a form of traditional citizenship (that bestowed by the Fourteenth
Amendment), but it instead was one granted by Congress according to its
Territory Clause powers.323 On top of that, the Constitution only speaks
of enfranchising “residents of the States,” not citizens.324 The Supreme
Court again refused to confront such an important question.325
3. Status Update
To define its relationship with the Government, or to try to augment
participation in the Government, Puerto Rico has engaged in the practice
of holding plebiscite after plebiscite to send a dim flare to Washington,
D.C. This ultimately boils down to the two major parties’—the PPD and
the Partido Nuevo Progresista (PNP)—efforts to sustain a “permanent
domestic relationship with the [mainland].”326
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As evidenced by congressional and White House records, more serious
efforts to improve the Commonwealth’s footing within the polity can be
traced back to as early as 1964. President Lyndon B. Johnson, at the first
meeting of the United States-Puerto Rico Commission on Puerto Rico,
mentioned that the “United States has a traditional and deep-seated
national commitment to the principle of self-determination.”327 Two years
later, the Commission issued a 2,000+ page report with three options:
maintenance of commonwealth status, statehood, or independence.328
Again, President Johnson issued a statement reaffirming that any choice
should be rooted in the “principles of mutual consent and selfdetermination.”329 Further, President Johnson asserted that any change
in status would be made with the “improvement and growth for the
[C]ommonwealth” in mind.330 In 1967, the Puerto Rican people spoke.
The Commonwealth option won a significant portion of the vote.331 The
status quo persevered.
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The plebiscite-as-social thermometer approach took the back seat until
1991 when there was a referendum meant to address the status question
yet again. That year, Governor Rafael Hernández Colón introduced a
referendum to amend the Commonwealth’s Constitution to ‘guarantee
democratic rights,’ which were the right to freely determine Puerto Rico’s
political status; right to opt for a status that was full of “political dignity
without colonial, territorial subordination to Congress’s plenary powers;”
the right to vote for the above-mentioned status alternatives; the right to
obtain an answer to the status question with over 50% of the vote; the
right to be guaranteed Puerto Rico’s culture, language, and identity,
including international athletic representation; the right to obtain the full
citizenship protections afforded to their counterparts in the mainland.332
The proposal was an abysmal failure, with the “No” option mustering over
50% of the vote.333
The pulse-through-plebiscite practice reached its cusp in the 1992 to
1993 period. After the defeat of the PPD in the polls, the PNP set out to

CELESTE BENÍTEZ, EL DÍA EN QUE PUERTO RICO HABLÓ: EL PLEBISCITO DE 1993 24 (1998)
(citation omitted). As to the international athletic representation, although Puerto Rico is
under the United States’ authority, the International Olympic Committee considers Puerto
Rico to be its own country. The fear that Puerto Ricans faced (and still do) when navigating
their political status options was that a more formal union with the mainland—statehood—
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explore its own plebiscite.334 The PNP launched campaigns to galvanize
the electorate in support of statehood.335 This plebiscite was unlike the
others, as it enthralled the millions of citizens on the island to act on their
preferred status options.336 Opposite the PNP, the PPD conjured the “Lo
Mejor de Dos Mundos” approach, aimed at preserving the commonwealth
(Estado Libre Asociado) status.337 To add to the plebiscite’s uniqueness,
this was the first time that the mainland took an active interest in Puerto
Rico’s decision.338 Moreover, the political process was developing in
bifurcated venues: in the mainland and throughout Puerto Rico’s streets,
residences, businesses, even in la tiendita en la esquina (which roughly
translates as “the store on the street corner”). The voters hit the polls and
returned a narrow indictment on the statehood option: The
commonwealth option gained 48% compared to 46% obtained by the
statehood option.339 This was known as the Day Puerto Rico spoke.340 In
a rare step, and to its credit, Congress followed up on the plebiscite’s
results by introducing House Resolution 3715.341 This was orchestrated
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as a means to incorporate Puerto Rico into the polity.342 In her book,
Senator Benítez claimed that this move was a thumb on the nose to
Puerto Ricans’ electoral choices, claiming that such a move would
undoubtedly include statehood.343 But such aspersion is unfounded.
Although incorporation traditionally meant being placed on a train to
statehood, it did not necessarily mean that statehood would come
tomorrow. What is more, incorporation would have included being
entirely subject to the protections of the United States Constitution,
instead of just those rights deemed fundamental. Several other
plebiscites followed in 1998 and 2012, but they bear no weight on this
thesis’s focus. Rather, what must be noted is that Puerto Ricans’ status
option opinions remained, for the most part, the same.
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X.

A Year to Remember: PROMESA, Franklin, &
Sanchéz Valle

Then came the year that shall live in infamy in the annals of Puerto
Rican history: 2016. Puerto Rico had been riding the wave of its financial
woes as best it could, but it was about to be consumed by it. In 2016, the
island had accrued over $70 billion in debt. However, it could not enact
any measure along the lines of fiscal austerity, given that Congress
debarred the island from pursuing any Chapter 9-related relief for
nebulose reasons in 1984. Two years before its showdown with creditors
at the Supreme Court, Puerto Rico had enacted a policy made to
circumvent this “No Man’s Land” situation. This measure was Puerto
Rico’s “version of a bankruptcy law, designed for its big public utilities,
which account[ed] for about $26 billion of the total debt.”344 But this was
also contrary to Chapter 9’s provision that “only Congress can enact
bankruptcy laws.”345 The Supreme Court would settle this as part of the
trifecta infringing upon Puerto Rico’s self-government victories via Public
Law 600. Likewise, as Puerto Rico’s debt spiraled, Congress attempted to
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address the situation through several pieces of legislation. Out of these,
the most restrictive piece of legislation was born.
Elsewhere on the island, at around the same period, the violations of
the commonwealth and federal laws by two individuals (as well as the
ensuing prosecutions) would create a situation that proved to be more
than just about aspects of criminal law. These violations were used by the
Court to further circumscribe the Commonwealth’s self-governing powers,
eroding Public Law 600’s main goal.
This next section discusses the three, focused on how these rulings and
Act of Congress worked not to build on those 1950 promises and grants
but served instead to sever them.

A. Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust
This case arrived at the Court because of Puerto Rico’s financial woes.
As a recap, Puerto Rico could not pay its gargantuan debt and was unable
to seek relief under Chapter 9 bankruptcy for no good reason other than
being exempt from a 1984 amendment to restructure bankruptcy
courts.346
“The Federal Bankruptcy Code,” the Court said in Puerto Rico v.
Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, “pre-empts state bankruptcy laws
that enable insolvent municipalities to restructure their debts over the

346

See Williams Walsh, supra note 299.
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objections of creditors and instead requires municipalities to restructure
debt under Chapter 9 of the Code.”347 In 1984, Congress excluded Puerto
Rico from falling under the ambit of Chapter 9’s definition of a debtor.348
But incongruity struck again, as the Court held that Congress’s omission
“prevent[ed] Puerto Rico from authorizing its municipalities to seek
Chapter 9 relief,” whilst at the same time concluding that Puerto Rico
“remain[ed] a State for other purposes related to Chapter 9 ( … ) including
its pre-emption provision.”349 The Court then explained that Puerto Rico
“is not a State for purposes of the gateway provision, so it cannot perform
the single function of the State[s] under that provision: to specifically
authoriz[e] municipalities to seek Chapter 9 relief.”350 The decision
belonged to Congress.
Ultimately, this meant that Puerto Rico could not act to prevent itself
from drowning under the weight of its debt. Again, nothing is more local
in scope than an entity’s finances. The Court’s decision in Franklin
California Tax-Free Trust removed any chance of Puerto Rico
restructuring or surviving its oppressive debt, effectively “shutting
[Puerto Rico] out of a right to restructure the huge financial obligations

136 S. Ct. 1938, 1942 (2016) (citation omitted).
Id. (“The Bankruptcy Code has long included Puerto Rico as a State, but in 1984 Congress
amended the definition of State to exclude Puerto Rico for the purpose of defining who may
be a debtor under chapter 9”) (internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted).
349 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
350 Id. at 1946 (alterations in original; inner quotation marks omitted; citation omitted).
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run up by its three public utilities.”351 Across First Street, Congress was
compiling a bill meant to address the debt situation; a bill that to this day
remains a thorn in Puerto Rico’s side.

B. Puerto Rico v. Sanchéz Valle & the Ultimate Source Doctrine
What started as a criminal case over violating the Puerto Rico Arms
Act of 2000,352 proved to be destructive to Puerto Rico’s sovereignty. The
issue began when Luis Sanchéz Valle and Jaime Goméz Vázquez sold
guns without permits to undercover police officers on separate
occasions.353 The Respondents were indicted under the Puerto Rico Arms
Act.354 After the Commonwealth’s indictments, federal grand juries
indicted the Respondents for violating like provisions of the United States’
gun trafficking laws.355 After pleading guilty to the federal violations,
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the Commonwealth charges on
grounds that they violated the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy
Clause.356 Petitioners, among them the Federal Government, alleged that
Puerto Rico and the United States qualified as distinct sovereigns, similar

Lyle Denniston, Opinion analysis: Puerto Rico’s debt woes left to
Congress, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 13, 2016, 2:03 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/opinion-analysis-puerto-ricos-debt-woes-left-tocongress/.
352 See 25 Laws P.R. Ann. §458 (2008).
353 Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1869 (2016).
354 Id.
355 Id.
356 Id.
351
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to a State and the Federal Government, for Double Jeopardy purposes.357
This meant that subsequent prosecutions could be raised against the
Respondents.358 However, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico ruled in
favor of the Respondents, claiming that the subsequent proceedings ran
afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause.359 The United States Supreme Court
agreed to take the case.
The Supreme Court reasoned that the question of whether Puerto Rico
and the United States counted as separate sovereigns for double jeopardy
purposes should not focus on the “extent of control one prosecuting
authority [wields] over the other,”360 but is based on “the ‘ultimate source’
of the power undergirding the respective prosecutions.”361 For this, the
Court said the “inquiry was historical, not functional,” with a focus on the
oldest roots of the power.362 After the Court used a line analogy to
illustrate the ultimate source doctrine,363 it went on to compare States
with Puerto Rico. Moreover, the States do not derive their prosecutorial

Id.
Id.
359 Id.
360 Id. at 1870 (alteration in original).
361 Id. at 1871 (citation omitted; original quotation marks omitted).
362 Id. This is interesting because the Court had employed the functional approach in
Boumediene when deciding whether constitutional provisions applied. But that is not the
subject of this thesis.
363 Id.
If two entities derive their power to punish from wholly independent sources (imagine
here a pair of parallel lines), then they may bring successive prosecutions. Conversely,
if those entities draw their power from the same ultimate source (imagine now two
lines emerging from a common point, even if later diverging), then they may not.
357
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powers from the Government. They are instead based on the “authority
originally belonging to them before admission to the Union and preserved
to them by the Tenth Amendment.”364 According to the Court, the logical
consequence of this was that States’ prosecutorial powers antedated
Congress.365 To follow the State example, the Court discussed Indian
tribes and their ‘primeval’ sovereignty, though also subject to Congress’s
plenary powers.366 Like a State, the Court described an Indian tribe’s
powers disconnected from any Federal Government delegation.367
What is the ultimate source of Puerto Rico’s powers? The Court held
that even though Puerto Rico had become somewhat detached from
Congress after the rise to commonwealth via the constitution-making
process, one could not help but find Congress at the beginning of the
line.368 Puerto Rico’s Constitution—meant to “accord to Puerto Rico the
degree of autonomy and independence normally associated with States of
the Union”369—was rendered worthless as a measure of autonomy: “The

Id. (alterations in original; original quotation marks omitted; citations omitted).
Id. (“State prosecutions therefore have their most ancient roots in an ‘inherent
sovereignty’ unconnected to, and indeed pre-existing, the U.S. Congress”) (citation omitted).
366 Id. at 1872 (“But unless and until Congress withdraws a tribal power—including the
power to prosecute—the Indian community retains that authority in its earliest form”)
(citation omitted).
367 Id.
368 Id. at 1874 (“Puerto Rico today has a distinctive, indeed exceptional, status as a selfgoverning Commonwealth. But our approach is historical. And if we go back as far as our
doctrine demands—to the “ultimate source” of Puerto Rico's prosecutorial power—we once
again discover the U.S. Congress”) (inner citation omitted).
369 Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. at 597.
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island's Constitution, significant though it is, does not break the chain [of
the Federal Government as the ultimate source].”370 The Court relegated
that compact based on mutual consent to a mere ceremonial document.
However, the Court did acknowledge that Congress had the prerogative to
“develop innovative approaches to territorial governance,” 371 which will be
used as support for alternative options to enhance the island’s
sovereignty. Still, the Court was flawed when it held that Puerto Rico’s
Constitution made the island a candidate to “avail itself of a wide variety
of futures,”372 for this assertion is incongruent with the pronouncement
that Congress is the island’s ultimate source of power vis-à-vis Congress is
the one with that authority; ultimate source necessitates ultimate power.
In the same way, the Court’s ultimate source doctrine poses another
flaw: If the ultimate source is adopted, thirty-seven out of the fifty States
would be violating the Double Jeopardy Clause ipso facto they were also
territories deriving their powers from Congress. Granted, the Court
seemed to foreclose that argument by alleging the States’ ultimate
authority came from the Tenth Amendment, while at the same time
saying that they preserved the sovereignty predating Congress’s

Id. at 1876.
Id.
372 Id.
370
371
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existence. Thus, only thirteen of the fifty derive their authority from
somewhere other than Congress.

C. A PROMESA for Puerto Rico
To culminate a month of reduction to Puerto Rico’s self-governing
powers, Congress enacted the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and
Economic Stability Act (hereinafter PROMESA). Ironically, the acronym
spelled “promise” in Spanish, but such a thing it was not. Under its vast
Territory Clause powers, Congress imposed the Financial Oversight and
Management Board (hereinafter FOMB) over Puerto Rico and its
finances.373 Among its many provisions, the FOMB had the final say in
determining and approving what Puerto Rico’s budget would be: “[T]he
[FOMB] shall determine in its sole discretion whether each proposed
Budget is compliant with the applicable Fiscal Plan.”374 As such, the
provision stripped Puerto Rico’s say over its budget, relegating the island’s
political branches to mere bystanders in the island’s governance. On top
of that, Puerto Rico’s proposed acts, executive orders, regulations, etc.,
were all subject to FOMB approval.375
To make matters worse, the FOMB is composed of unelected members,
making them subject to appointment by the President and Congress.

48 U.S.C.A. § 2121 (West).
See 48 U.S.C.A. § 2142 (c) (d) (West).
375 See 48 U.S.C.A. § 2144 (a) (b) (c) (West).
373
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Consequently, the island’s already federally disenfranchised electorate is
once again victim to the whims of leaders whom they do not get to choose.
Additionally, if the FOMB does not agree with the proposals, it can choose
to bypass Puerto Rico’s electorate and its political branches, and enact its
fiscal plans.376 Moreover, the FOMB stands as an omnipotent being
overseeing Puerto Rico’s local affairs. Like Spain in colonial times, like
Congress before 1950, the FOMB casts a heavy, sprawling shadow over
the island. Its all-reaching control desecrates the lofty goals of Public Law
600, that is, the greater measures for the island’s self-government. In
short, the institution of FOMB was the definitive strike to Puerto Rico’s
sovereignty and continues to be detrimental to the island’s selfgovernment; measures of austerity usurped the small degree of selfgovernment earned from 1950 to 1952.
It is difficult to find any positives to the FOMB, as even the nowChairman, David Skeel, points out the fatalities in the FOMB’s structure
and powers: “We were not democratically elected and the authority we
have been given temporarily reduces the authority of Puerto Rico's elected
officials.”377 It is hard to say the FOMB has reduced Puerto Rico’s
authority temporarily, given that it has been five years since the FOMB’s

David Skeel, Reflections on Two Years of P.R.O.M.E.S.A., 87 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 862 at 871
(2018).
377 Id. at 880 (emphasis added).
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institution and there is no end in sight. Additionally, Mr. Skeel
propounded a similar complaint that the FOMB’s policies would “prove too
stringent,” but as he wrote, those policies would not “prove harmful.”378
But this is wrong, as the measures have usurped virtually every ounce of
control Puerto Rico had over its budget and its policies; nothing is more
local and powerful than the power of the purse. On top of that, the Biden
Administration stated that “Puerto Rico, and the more than 3 million
American citizens who call it home, deserve to be treated with dignity and
respect.”379 But if the Administration is willing, it could push Congress to
augment the Commonwealth’s say over its local affairs, including the
disparity in federal benefits,380 and other myriad options such as
reinstating the President’s Task Force in the island, and a relief package
for the island.381 Yet this remains to be seen, as the Administration has
focused on defending Puerto Rico’s exclusion from access to equal federal
benefits.382 The dispute has arrived at the Supreme Court’s marbled halls

Id.
The Biden-Harris Plan for Recovery, Renewal and Respect for Puerto Rico,
WWW.JOEBIDEN.COM, https://joebiden.com/the-biden-harris-plan-for-recovery-renewal-andrespect-for-puerto-rico/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2021).
380 See nn. 263-69.
381Federico de Jesús & Laura Rodriguez, An Urgent Rescue Plan for Puerto Rico, Center for
American Progress (Apr. 28, 2021),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/reports/2021/04/28/498841/urgent-rescueplan-puerto-rico/.
382 Dánica Soto, US fights ruling to extend SSI benefits to Puerto Rico, U.S.NEWS (June 7,
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and it was just argued before the Justices.383 Just like a game of six
degrees, the Court is once again roped into resolving important questions
about the island’s standing within the polity, and if the historical inquiry
proceeds, the island’s future appears grim. Consequently, Public Law
600’s promise—that of self-government—has been broken.
The next task, then, lies in finding solutions to the island’s problems.

See James Romoser, Justices suggest that Congress has leeway to exclude Puerto Rico from
federal disability benefits, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 9, 2021, 4:23 PM),
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XI. Reaching Greatness and Building Upon It
Greatness is not in where we stand but in what direction we are moving.
We must sail sometimes with the wind and sometimes against it—but sail
we must and not drift, nor lie at anchor
-Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
Doubtless, Puerto Rico has been exercising a very truncated, enfeebled
version of those once-great self-governing powers. How best to address
Puerto Rico’s situation has been plaguing the minds of both the island’s
prime politico-legal minds, as well as those in the mainland, and even some
elected officials in Washington, D.C. But the reality is that nothing inhibits
Congress from pursuing solutions that then legal officer Felix Frankfurter
framed around the phrase “inventive statesmanship.”384 Congress needs to
honor the basis of that compact it once consensually entered with Puerto
Rico. Moreover, it is Congress that must and needs to address the situation,
for the courts have either refused to answer the important questions or they
have abstained from fundamentally altering the imbalance of power. As
proven, the courts have effectively pretended they are not in town, and
instead drawn signs pointing the island to where Congress sits. To illustrate,
reference to the Supreme Court’s latest ruling regarding Puerto Rico’s
sovereignty is necessary. In the October Term 2019, the Court considered a

Rafael Hernández Colón, The Evolution of Democratic Governance Under the Territorial
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 50 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 587 (2017).
384
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challenge to the composition of the organ known as the Financial Oversight
and Management Board (FOMB)—as described in the above section.385 The
complaint was not one aimed at its member but instead aimed at the method
of selecting those members. Given that the President need not obtain Senate
confirmation for the appointments,386 the challenge alleged that the
Appointments Clause of the Constitution was being violated.387 The Supreme
Court held that even though the Appointments Clause restricts the
unconfirmed appointment of officials, members of the FOMB were not officers
under the Clause’s definition, since they were primarily charged with local
duties.388 The undemocratically chosen FOMB was upheld. Thus, it is logical
and just that Congress be the body that crafts a solution through its broad
territorial legislative powers. In this section, the focus will be on discussing
those options under the “inventive statesmanship” umbrella and those
measures which Congress has embarked upon recently.
In a 1914 memo, future Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote down the
phrase inventive statesmanship, and its definition was not found. But Chief
Justice Earl Warren shone a light on the obscure phrase while delivering a
commemorative address in Puerto Rico:

Fin. Oversight and Mgt. Bd. for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649 (2020).
Id. at 1654.
387 U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States …”).
388 Aurelius, 140 S. Ct. at 1661.
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[O]ur American system is not static, in the sense that it is not an end
but the means to an end; in the sense that it is an organism intended to
grow and expand to meet varying conditions and items in a large
country; in the sense that every governmental effort of ours is an
experiment—so the new institutions of the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico represent an experiment—the newest experiment and perhaps the
most notable of American governmental experiments in our lifetimes.389
This brings us back to those noble and novel roots behind Public Law 600,
roots that were lost across time, courts, Congresses, and public servants. But
Chief Justice Warren’s statement goes deeper, as it leads back to the
question: What can Congress do? The solution lies in the problem. Congress
possesses awesome powers under the Territory Clause, and it has been
empowered by the courts, particularly the Supreme Court during the Insular
Cases, to enact “all Needful Rules and Regulations respecting the
Territor[ies].”390 The only thing prohibiting Congress from enacting any
measures to diffuse self-government throughout its territorial holdings is
Congress itself. For the most part, the courts do not restrict Congress’s
power concerning the territories, and the Executive is a rather passive agent.
It then follows that Congress needs to put those awesome powers to good use.
What does “inventive statesmanship” look like? It is up to Congress, with
Puerto Rico’s consent, to define it. However, this should not be misguided by
the status questions plaguing the island’s three major political parties, for
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those party-line quarrels are irrelevant. Moreover, Puerto Rico needs to
embody that experimental nature that Chief Justice Warren spoke of without
any specific reference to the status question’s disposition. Even a ruling as
harmful to Puerto Rico’s self-government as Sanchéz Valle explicates that
Congress holds “broad latitude to develop innovative approaches to territorial
governance” under the Territory Clause.391 Similarly, in Aurelius, Justice
Sotomayor’s concurrence hearkens to the benevolent aims of Public Law 600
and the Constitution it bred. Indeed, Justice Sotomayor noted that “[w]ith
the passage of Public Law 600 and the adoption and recognition of the Puerto
Rico Constitution, the United States and Puerto Rico ... forged a unique
political relationship, built on the island's evolution into a constitutional
democracy exercising local self-rule.”392 These pronouncements confirm the
notion that all roads lead to Congress. For Congress to honor the compact’s
promises and to use those formidable Territory Clause powers, it must adopt
the inventive statesmanship approach.
As to what Congress has recently done with this great power, we turn to
the competing bills that have been introduced. One bill, the “SelfDetermination Act,” allows Puerto Ricans to consider “the implications of

Sanchéz Valle, supra note 325, at 1876 (citation omitted).
Aurelius, 140 S. Ct. at 1672 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted; citation omitted).
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each of the status option and what transitional plans would look like.”393
Parallel to this is the statehood bill.394 These are reflective of the island’s
divided opinions: whether Puerto Rico should become a State or something
else. But these are trivial matters, for the problems do not lie in the island’s
status, but instead in Congress’s administration of it. We reach Congress’s
doorsteps yet again; the problem ends where the problem began.

Nicole Acevedo, Statehood or self-determination? Tensions over Puerto Rico status rise
amid opposing bills, CBS NEWS (Apr. 15, 2021, 11:14 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/statehood-or-self-determination-tensions-over-puertorico-status-rise-n1264184.
394 Russell Contreras, Sen. Martin Heinrich to introduce plan for Puerto Rico statehood, (Mar.
2, 2021), https://www.axios.com/sen-heinrich-puerto-rico-statehood-plan-49d07d8c-77d34e87-bf71e88404d4d35c.html?utm_campaign=organic&utm_medium=socialshare&utm_source=twitter
.
393

101

XII. Conclusion
Puerto Rico’s trajectory is somewhat irregular. It went from a colony to a
colonial territory to Commonwealth to the amalgamated, weakened condition
it finds itself in today. This is because of Congress’s and the Court’s
encroachments on Puerto Rico’s self-government. While the climax of the
encroachments came in 2016, the phenomena have been part of Puerto Rico’s
history as a United States territory since its acquisition by the United States
after the Spanish-American War. After being ceded to the United States by
the Treaty of Paris of 1898, Congress took the reins and ran Puerto Rico
differently—without the full protection of the Constitution. Congress
justified this under its plenary powers to administer territories as granted by
the Territory Clause. The Supreme Court justified this anomalous
interpretation in a series of decisions coined the Insular Cases in the Early
Twentieth Century. However, those decisions stand on thin soil, as the
Court’s decisions in the ensuing years slowly eroded the weight of the Insular
Cases. Alongside these judicial decisions stands the monumental change
Puerto Rico embarked on in the 1950s through its constitution-making
process and the commonwealth status. Both the constitution-making process
and the rise to commonwealth were meant to accord Puerto Rico State-like
sovereignty. What is more, those processes were the first of their kind, but
they did not pan out quite like that. The erstwhile gains were instead
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relegated to mere plot points in Puerto Rico’s territorial history, rather than
the defining moments they were. The pinnacle of these trespasses on Puerto
Rico’s self-government came in 2016 with two Supreme Court decisions and
an Act of Congress. Rather than reversing Puerto Rico’s sovereign decline,
the Court and Congress accelerated it to its maximum potential.
Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust provided no benefit for
the island as it struggled for aid in the face of a financial apocalypse. But it
was Puerto Rico v. Sanchéz Valle that proved to be most consequential, as it
uprooted those gains advanced by Public Law 600 and elevation to the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The Court stated that Puerto Rico derives its
powers solely from the Federal Government, not the island’s Constitution or
its people. Across the street, Congress instituted a measure designed to
rescue Puerto Rico from its elephantine debt crisis. Instead of assisting, the
measure supplanted Puerto Rico’s control over its internal affairs, as it
stripped Puerto Rico’s political branches from having a final say over the
island’s budgets, policies that contained spending, and attempts to sever the
line between the crushing debt and the island. This came in the form of the
preeminent Financial Oversight and Management Board and its stupendous
powers. Yet the issue cannot stop here.
Because Puerto Rico’s sovereignty has been curtailed, the most pressing
concern is how to solve these issues. The reality is that Congress holds great
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powers under the Territory Clause to administer Puerto Rico in the way it so
desires. That means that it could abstain from the dogma that makes Puerto
Rico and its citizens unequal. Instead, it should focus on realizing this selfgovernment experiment and provide the Commonwealth with the blessings of
liberty, including participation in determining its fate.
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